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The New Jersey Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurefl (Mount Laurel
II) is a remarkable instance of judicial policymaking and a veritable lodestone
of general and specific policy prescriptions for municipal governments,
developers, and trial courts., The ruling initiates several structural changes in
the horizontal relationships between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of state government, as well as in the vertical relationships between state
and local governments. Some of these changes are starkly political in nature.
Mount Laurel// also establishes an elaborate matrix of priorities between competing social and economic concerns in New Jersey.
Invoking the state constitution's requirements of fundamental fairness,
substantive due process and equal protection and the state's inherent police
powers to control the use of land for the general welfare/ the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II actively initiated far~ranging changes in
numerous areas of the law including land use planning, appellate procedure,
remedies, evidence, local government and administrative law. Indeed, Mount
Laurel// is a quintessential example of what Professors Porter and Tarr have
l. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mount Laurel 11].

2. Tbe New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the constitutional basis for the Mount
Laurel doctrine as follows:
The constitutional basis for the Mount Laurel doctrine remains the same.
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to
legislation, is but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the general welfare. When the exercise of that power by a municipality
affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes
more than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes
the general welfare
in this case the housing needs
of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing
demand within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that conflict
with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power and are unconstitu...
tional. In particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite
opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low and moderate income
housing conflict with the general welfare and violate the state constitutional
requirements of substantive due process and equal protection. Mount Laurel
/, 67 N.J. at 174 and 181.

Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415. See also NEw

JERSEY STATE

BAR AssoCIATION, LAND UsE LAW SECTION, MoUNT LAUREL II I (Aug. 1983), reprinted
in 112 N.J.L.J. 393 (Oct. 13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as STATE BAR MouNT LAUREL
II REPORT].
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3

termed innovative policymaking
the most potent form of state supreme
4
court policymaking.
Government by judiciary necessarily causes many consequences and costs
throughout the policy landscape. Not only are the immediate Mount Laurel
II litigants
the numerous municipalities, assorted developers and public
interest groups involved in the consolidated review
affected by the decision, but a number of non-parties are also directly touched by the ruling. This
is a result of the supreme court's statewide regional model of inclusionary
zoning. 5 Less obvious but equally important are what Donald Horowitz has
termed second-order consequences of judicial forays into social policymaking. 6

3. See STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM XVi-xvii
(M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE SUPREME CouRTs]. According to this typology:
Although in some sense all [state supreme court] policymaking entails innovation, as used here innovative policymaking refers to policymaking (a) that
either overturns an existing state policy or fills a gap in state policy; (b) in
which the initiative comes from within the state supreme court, rather than
being mandated by either federal authorities or other branches of state government; and (c) that imposes specific policies. Most frequently [state] constitutional interpretation supplies the basis for such policymaking.

/d.

4. /d. Professors Tarr and Porter categorize five major types of state supreme
court policymaking other than innovative policymaking. The other types of policymaking
are the following: agenda-setting policymaking (forcing political authorities to find
alternative means of pursuing policy objectives); complementary policymaking (rulings
that either aid state legislative goals or relieve state legislators of the onus of taking
politically awkward stands); elaborative policymaking (extension of precedent enunciated by the United States Supreme Court by state supreme courts); restrictive
policymaking (limitation and/or evasion of policies developed by the United States
Supreme Court); and institutional policymaking (Judicial activity directed toward preserving the autonomy and integrity of courts and the judici~l process). /d. at xvii-xviii.
5. In addition to the municipal litigants, developers, and public interest groups
before the court in Mount Laurel II, virtually every municipality in the state as well
as any developer interested in constructing new buildings anywhere in the state will
be affected by the decision. Moreover, public interest groups and non-profit organizations that view any municipal activity as impeding the goals and purposes of Mount
Laurel II have standing to challenge the municipality in future litigation. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1984, at AI, col. 1.
6. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 292 (1977) (hereinafter cited
as CouRTS AND SociAL PoLICY]. This concept originated in a previous study that dealt
with second-order consequences. R. BAUER, SECOND-ORDER CoNSEQUENCES: A
METHODOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY (1969).
Horowitz notes that:
Costs may show up only much later and in more far-flung forums than benefits.
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These second-order consequences are particularly troublesome because they
involve unanticipated social costs, which may surface much later and in dif-·
1
ferent forums than benefits of the decision~
This Article focuses on the second-order consequences, unforeseen by the
judiciary, that will result from Mount Laurel II. These consequences will be
accompanied by social costs in such diverse policy areas as educational finance,
local government autonomy and patterns of energy development and use within
the state. The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it is to explain why
Mount Laurel// presents the prospect for such perplexing and far~ flung secondorder conse-q uences. Second, it is to explore in detail one disturbing example
of the decision's unforeseen consequences: the prospect that development of
a promising source of alternative energy
solar space and water heating in
buildings
will be stifled at the local level without a corresponding mandate
at the state level, resulting in continued and aggravated dependence on electricity, fossil fuels and other non-renewable sources of energy for the long8
term future.
In its first section, the Article discusses the basic holdings and policy mandates of the Mount Laurel II decision. Cj In its second section, the Article defines
the concepts of second-order consequences and postulates likely zoning and
land use second-order consequences of the case. 10 The Article focuses on the
1
specific area of solar energy development in New Jersey in its third section. •
Particular concern is given to the implications of Mount Laurel II on municipal
willingness to encourage, through appropriate land use regulations, solar energy
use in residential and commercial structures. In the next section, the Article
provides a further inventory of possible second-order consequences of.the
Mount Laurel II ruling, viewed from a political as well as a socio-economic
12
perspective. Finally, the Article concludes with some pragmatic proposals
for minimizing second-order consequences when state supreme courts engage
13
in innovative policymaking.

Put differently, costs may be more widely shared than benefits, and they are
certainly less easily verifiable than at least the_intended benefits are, since
they are typically unintended and therefore not targeted for inclusion in reports
and other monitoring efforts.
293.
D. HoROWITZ, supra note 6, at 293.
See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 14-74 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 75-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 251-63 and accompanying text.

COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLICY, at

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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HoLDINGS AND PoLICY MANDATES

Judicial Motivations for the Decision

Mount Laurel II was a decade in the making. 14 This single fact explains'
much about the decision: over time, the New Jersey Supreme Court witnessed
its promising constitutional seed emerge as a stunted sapling. Rather than
uproot its doctrine and start from scratch
a course some commentators
15
the court, in a surprising move, performed radical
predicted would occur
surgery, transplanting its transmogrified doctrine to richer soil.
The court was frustrated by the lack of implementation of the constitutional doctrine it first articulated in Southern Burlington Count)' NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laure/ 16 (Mount Laurel!) from its inception in 1975.
That seminal case held in broad and undefined terms that a developing
municipality violates the state's constitutional mandate to exercise zoning
powers for the general welfare when it fails to affirmatively afford "a realistic
opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the present and prospec7
tive regional need for low- and moderate-income housing.''~ Notwithstanding
that a considerable cause of Mount Laurel rs implementational difficulties
were of the court's own making, the supreme court in Mount Laurel II, while
implicitly acknowledging the deficiencies of its past decisions, down played the

14. The trial court initially invalidated Mount Laurel Township's zoning ordinance
in 1973, 10 years before the supreme court's decision in Mount Laurel II. Mount
Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 198, 456 A.2d at 410.
For general historical background of the New Jersey Supreme Court's articula-

tion and development of the doctrine of inclusionary zoning, see D. MosKOWITZ,
EXCLUSIONARY ZoNING LITIGATION 225-69 (1977). for more recent pre-Mount Laurel
II developments, see D. ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLAN~ING LAw 177-88 (1981)~
Judicial development of exclusionary zoning principles in other states and in
the federal courts is discussed in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING IN THE SEVENTJES 235-46 (R. Freilicht & E. Stuhler eds. 1981); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND
EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE 79-106 (1981); M. MANN, THE RIGHT To HousING: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND REMEDIES IN EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 53-103 (1976).
15. 1981 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK§ 2.02(4] (F. Strom ed.). The

Handbook notes:
[S]ome observers are predicting that, given the substantial change in the courCs
composition since 1975 (only three of the original seven justices remain) and
the substantial problems which have been encountered in administering the
Mount Laurel mandates, the court may use this occasion to abandon or
substantially alter its original position on exclusionary zoning.

/d.
16. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount
Laurel!), modified and enforced, 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (Law Div. 1978),
rev'd in part and remanded, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
17 ~ Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413 (citing Mount Laurel /,
67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724).
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significance of doctrinal confusion. Instead, the court placed the primary blame
for the failure to get lower-income housing built on what it perceived to be
the proximate cause of the lack of progress: municipal resistance and abuse
18
of the legal process. Mount Laurel Township itself triggered palpable anger
on the part of the court. In the first paragraph of its decision, the court stated:
The (Mount Laurel I] doctrine has become famous. The Mount Laurel
case itself threatens to become infamous. After all this time, ten years
after the trial court's initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance,
Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary
ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts,
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe
that there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case. 19
This opening statement set the tone for what was to follow.
Another motivation for the scope, detail and potency of Mount Laurel
II was the New Jersey Supreme Court's perception of unjustified failure by
the legislature and appropriate state administrative agencies to enforce the mandate of Mount Laurel I. The court was clearly disappointed by the unwillingness of the more political branches of state government to give quantifiable
substance to judicial concepts of "region" and "fair share" in order to foster
actual construction of low- and moderate-income housing in municipalities
20
throughout the state.
The court's implicit recognition of doctrinal confusion, anger at perceived
municipal evasiveness, and impatience with inaction by coordinate branches
of government was joined with a general ·c oncern for its own judicial
legitimacy. 21 This last concern had two distinct dimensions: first, a defensive
resolve that court orders be obeyed by responsible officials, and second, a
positive vision of the court as an essential formulator of major state policy
initiatives. Indeed, the latter aspect of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
weltanschauung had considerably matured and enlarged over the eight years
22
between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II. Taken together, these judicial

18. /d. at 198-202, 456 A.2d at 409-11.
19. /d. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410.
20. See id. at 212-13, 456 A.2d at 417.
21. See id. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456.
22. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been a leader of what might be termed
"a unique judicial culture" since the time that Arthur Vanderbilt became Chief Justice
of the court in 1947. See generally STATE SUPREME CoURTs, supra note 3, at 4. However,
the New Jersey Supreme Court considerably enlarged upon this tradition by handing
down a number of landmark policymaking decisions during the last eight years. Examples
of these decisions include In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (in an opinion
recognizing a wide-ranging right of privacy, the supreme court authorized withdrawal
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motivations created an irresistible force which resulted in a truly unique and
momentous decision. 23

B..

Essential Mandates

In order to understand fully the second-order consequences of Mount
Laurel II, the fundamental holdings of the decision must first be surveyed.
Each of the seven major holdings of Mount L,aurel II will be discussed in
this section of the Article. More specific and less obvious principles of the
decision are addressed in Sections III and IV of the Article.
Suspension of ''Developing Municipality'''
Benchmark and Replacement by State
Development Guide Plan ''Growth Areas''

1.,

The most significant result of the Mount Laurel II decision is the elimina24
tion, for the foreseeable future, of the six-part Mount Laurel/ ''developing

of the life support system of a comatose young woman without civil or criminal liability
on the part of any participant in the process); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346
A.2d 66 (1975) (court rejected the United States Supreme Court's more restrictive standard and held that the waiver standard under the search and seizure provision of the
state constitution applied to consent searches, thus placing the burden on the state
to demonstrate knowledge of a right to refuse consent); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J.
496, 341 A.2d 629 (1.975) (court fashioned limited-use immunity respecting the use
of prisoner's statements in prison disciplinary proceedings in subsequent criminal
prosecutions based on extraconstitutional considerations of fairness and rightness);
Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975) (after three years and five
intervening rulings coupled with endless legislative, executive and judicial negotiations,
the supreme court made a final last-ditch response to legislative, intransigence by enjoining
the expenditure of school funds until the legislature enacted the state's first income
tax law), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1976); and State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333
A.id 257 (1975) (through the exercise of "broad administrative and procedural powers
vested" in the court, the New Jersey Supreme Court made an exhaustive reassessment
of the prohibition against double jeopardy requiring compulsory joinder of offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode).
23. Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a unanimous court, commented on the
six consolidated cases that made up Mount Laurel II and noted:

[These cases] demonstrate the need to put some steel in [the Mount Laurel]
doctrine. The deficiencies in its application range from uncertainty and
inconsistency at the trial level to inflexible review criteria at the appellate level.
The waste of judicial energy involved at every level is substantial and is matched
only by the often needless expenditure of talent on the part of lawyers and
experts. The length and complexity of trials is often outrageous, and the expense
of litigation is so high that a real question develops whether a municipality
can afford to defend or the plaintiffs can afford to sue.
Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410-11 (emphasis provided; footnotes
omitted).
24. The court indicated that while it was replacing the Mount Laurel I test with

•
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municipality" test 25 for determining which municipalities are subject to inclu26
sionary zoning responsibilities for low- and moderate-income housing. Under
Mount Laurel II the obligation extends, instead, to every municipality in which
is located an area designated as a ''growth area'' under the State Developthe use of the SDGP to determine a municipality's constitutional obligation, if the
state takes action causing the use of the SDGP to become inappropriate for Mount
Laurel purposes, the trial court must ''revert to the prior 'developing' tests to determine whether the Mount L,aurel obligation applies." /d. at 248 n.21, 456 A.2d at 435
n.21. These tests, however, would be modified under Mount Laurel II as follows:
developed municipalities, including the central cities and built-up suburbs, will be subject to the Mount Laurel obligation. !d. The court noted that
•

[t]he most significant question in such cases will ordinarily be whether there
is any land available for development, and, if not, what kind of remedy is
appropriate to assure that as land becomes available, a realistic opportunity
exists for the construction of lower income housing, assuming it is otherwise
suitable for that purpose.
!d. The court also subjected "developing, municipalities to the Mount Laurel obligation and disavowed that ''the so-called six criteria must be satisfied to characterize
a municipality as developing.'' The court noted that '' Ia]ny combination of factors
demonstrating that the municipality is in the process of significant commercial, industrial
or residential growth or is encouraging such growth, or is in the path of inevitable
future commercial, industrial or residential growth will suffice." !d. (emphasis in
original).
25. The six criteria of a "developing municipality" require that the municipality:

(1) [have] a sizeable land area, (2) [lie] outside the central cities and the older
built-up suburbs, (3) {have] substantially shed rural characteristics, (4) [have]
undergone great population increases since World War II or is now in the
process of doing so, (5) not [be] completely developed, and (6) [be] in the
path of inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and
growth.
/d. at 223-24, 456 A.2d at 422 (quoting Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township,

164 N.J. Super. 563, 567-68, 397 A.2d 384, 386 (Law Div. 1978)).
26. The terms "low" and "moderate" income housing had not been defined
by the supreme court prior to Mount Laurel II. In Mount Laurel II, the court borrowed
from the definition contained in the Federal Section 8 Housing Program as follows:
''Moderate income families'' are those whose incomes are no greater than
80 percent and no less that 50 percent of the median income of the area,
with adjustments for smaller and larger families. "Lower income families"
are those whose incomes do not exceed 50 percent of the median income of
the area, with adjustments for smaller and larger families. See, 42 U.S. C.
§1437a(b)(2) (1982 Supp.), in which these definitions are used to define income
standards for the Section 8 housing subsidy program. Our phraseology differs from that in the Section 8 program, which defines "lower income families"
as analogous to our moderate-income families, and "very low income families"
as analogous to our "low income." 42 U.S.C. §1437a(b)(2)(1982 Supp.).
92 N.J. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8. "Area," for purposes of the Mount Laurel
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ment Guide Plan (SDGP), promulgated by the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs. 27 The Mount Laurel obligation does not extend to
municipalities which contain only areas designated by the SDGP as non-growth
areas. Non-growth area designations include ''o_p en spaces, rural areas, prime
farmland, conservation areas, limited growth areas, parts of the Pinelands
28
and certain Coastal Zone areas. " As a result of these designations the obligation of Mount Laurel II applies to New Jersey's central cities and developed
suburbs. 29 Those who seek to escape the consequences of the SDGP designa30
tion bear a heavy burden.
2.. Universal Obligation of All Municipalities
to Provide Realistic Opportunity for Resident Poor
Notwithstanding the court's approach of limiting responsibility for present and future regional housing needs of lower-income persons to SDGP
"growth areas," the court took an expansive view of municipal responsibility
for providing housing for indigenous poor. 31 Each of New Jersey's 567
municipalities now must provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing
of its indigenous poor. There is an exception, however, where the poor represent a disproportionately large segment of the municipal population as comdoctrine calculation of moderate-income families and low-income families, is defined
by the court as a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). See id. Thus, ~ccord:
ing to the court, ''A_t any particular time, an interested municipality, developer or
judge can find out what (the constantly changing] low and moderate income levels
are in the area . . . by asking the regional office of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development in either Camden or Newark." !d. Since there are presently two
SMSA' s in New Jersey and the median income is historically higher in the New York
SMSA, as a general rule more expensive low- and moderate-income housing will be
built in the north than in the south resulting in northern growth area municipalities
paying a higher subsidy for lower-income housing than their counterparts in the southern
part of the state.
The supreme court deems housing to be affordable for lower-income families
when a "family pays no more than 25 percent of its income for such housing," notwithstanding the court's recognition that the federal government in 1981 adjusted its
calculations for the maximum amount of rent supplements payable to low-income
tenants. !d. The federal government now estimates that no more than 30o/o of a tenant's
income should be paid for housing pursuant to 12 U .S.C. § 1701s(d) (1982). /d.
The lower-income regional housing need, according to Mount Laurel II, is made
up of both low- and moderate-income housing according to the above definitions. The
court found that a municipality's fair share should include both in such proportion
as reflects all relevant factors, including the proportion of lo\v- and moderate-income
housing that make up the regional need. !d. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419.
27. 92 N.J. at 215, 223-48, 456 A.2d at 418, 422-36.
28. /d. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.
29. See supra note 24.
30. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.
31. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418. "Indigenous poor" is defined by the court
as a municipality's resident poor who occupy dilapidated housing. Id. at 214, 456 A.2d
at 418.
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pared with the rest of the region. 32 The exception to this universal municipal
responsibility would apply to most of the state's urban areas, which currently
house substantial percentages of poor people.
3..

Elimination of the Good Faith Standard
for Judging Municipal Compliance

Under Mount Laurel I and its progeny, a municipality could defend an
exclusionary zoning attack by showing a good faith effort to comply. 33 Mount
Laurel II rejects this "numberless approach" in future litigation. Now, in the
typical case, a plaintiff's proofs will involve evidence of a municipality's fair
regional share of low- and moderate-income housing on an immediate
basis, as well as in the medium-range future. 34 ln atypical situations, plaintiffs will be able to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional exclusionary
zoning by proving that the pertinent municipal ordinance is "substantially
35
affected by restrictive devices." In such a case, the plaintiff's proof creates
a presumption that the ordinance is invalid. To overcome this presumption
the local government must show quantitative compliance with its regional fair
share obligation. 36

4.

Calculations of Regional Fair Share are Binding
on Parties and Presumptively Valid for Non-Parties

A limited number of specialized Mount Laurel judges, designated by the
Chief Justice, will decide exclusionary zoning litigation arising under Mount
37
Laurel II. Determinations of region and regional housing need will be binding
on all municipalities party to such lawsuits., These judicial determjnations will
38
also have presumptive validity for non-party municipalities.

5.

Municipal Responsibilities in Meeting
the Mount Laurel Obligation

A municipality subject to a Mount Laurel II obligation has a panoply
of interconnected hierarchical responsibilities. These responsibilities
starting with the most basic
are discussed here in turn.
First, all municipalities subject to the Mount Laurel obligation must
•

32. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
33. See id. at 220, 456 A.2d at 421.
34. /d. at 215-16, 220-22~ 456 A.2d at 418-19, 420-21. See generally G.

STERNLIEB
BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED

& R.
(1973).

35. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
36. /d.
37. /d. at 216-17, 456 A.2d at 419.
38. /d. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.

•
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39

eliminate unnecessary cost-producing requirements by removing zoning and
subdivision restrictions and exactions that are not necessary to protect health
40
and safety.
Second, unless removal of restrictive barriers will provide a realistic
opportunity for the construction of the municipality's fair share of the region's
41
lower-income housing need, affirmative measures are required. These measures
include, but are not limited to the following: (a) municipal cooperation with
42
developers' attempts to obtain state and federal housing subsidies; (b) provi43
sion of lower-income housing through a local housing agency; (c) employment of "inclusionary devices" such as (i) lower-income density bonuses for
developers (i.e., incentive zoning that increases the permitted density as the
44
amount of lower-income housing provided is increased) and (ii) mandatory
45
set-asides accompanied by continued municipal regulation of resale so that
the designated housing units will continue to be occupied by lower-income
persons, 46 and municipal supervision of the phase-in of lower-income units
as the development progresses; 47 (d) zoning substantial areas for low cost mobile
homes and other types of low cost housing; 48 (e) establishing maximum square
49
footage zones; and (f) "overzoning" for lower-income housing. 50
39. I d. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419.
40. /d. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441.
41. /d. at 261, 456 A.2d at 443 ..
42. /d. at 262, 456 A.2d at 443. This responsibility potentially would create
additional responsibilities on the part of a municipality such as enactment of a "resolution of need" stating that "there is a need for moderate-income housing" in the
municipality, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14J-6(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985), and granting
of tax abatements to developers to comport with state or federal regulations, see, e.g.,
42 U .S.C. 1437f (Supp. 1982) (section 8 federal low- and moderate-income housing
programs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:141-S(f).
43. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 263, 456 A.2d at 444. While the New Jersey
Supreme Court indicates that creation of a housing authority is not a requirement
for municipal satisfaction of its Mount Laurel obligation, id. at 264, 456 A.2d at 444,
the clear implication of the court's decision is that such a step by a municipality would
go far toward meeting the affirmative action requirements and may, indeed, be required.
See generally id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451 (all affirmative measures possible are required
before least cost housing is acceptable in meeting a municipality's Mount Laurel
obligation).
44. /d. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
45. /d. at 267-70, 456 A.2d at 446.
46. /d. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
47. /d.
48. /d. at 274-77, 456 A.2d at 450-51.
49. /d. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447. Maximum square footage zones are defined
by the court as ''zones where developers cannot build units with more than a certain
footage or build anything other than lower income housing or housing that includes
a ·specified portion of lower income housing." !d. (emphasis in original).
50. !d. "Overzoning" is defined by the court as "zoning to allow for more than
the fair share [of a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation] if it is likely, as it usually
is, that not all of the property made available for lower income housing will actually
result in [the construction] of such housing.,, !d. (emphasis in original) .
•
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Third, assuming that all restrictions and exactions have been removed from
the zoning ordinance and all affirmative measures have been attempted, then
a municipality may satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation by merely "supplementing whatever lower income housing can be built with [providing realistic
opportunity for the construction of] enough 'least cost' housing to satisfy the
fair share." 51 The court defines least cost housing stringently: the least ex pensive housing that builders can provide after the municipality removes all
excessive restrictions and exactions and after the municipality has used all
52
affirmative devices that might lower costs."
.
While the Mount Laurel obligation could conceivably be satisfied by a
local government's successful accomplishment of a lower-level responsibility
on the hierarchy, 53 this is by no means guaranteed. A municipality may not
find out whether it has fulfilled its constitutional obligation until its zoning
ordinance is challenged in court and a judgment rendered on compliance or
non-compliance. Accordingly, from a litigation-avoidance standpoint, a
municipality will have a strong incentive to attempt to simultaneously meet
all of the court-imposed hierarchical responsibilities, even though the lowerlevel responsibilities are theoretically mutually exclusive.
51. /d. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451. One of the difficulties in fully comprehending
the Mount Laurel II decision is reconciling the court's "Summary of Rulings," id.
at 214-20, 456 A.2d at 418-21, with the substantive discussion in the remainder of
the opinion. In some cases, the summary contains different language and leads to
possibly different interpretations than the actual text of the opinion. See infra note 58.
52. 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451. The court presumes that such housing will
be inexpensive enough to provide shelter for families who cannot afford housing in
the conventional suburban market, although it will be unaffordable for those in the
lower-income brackets. !d. The court states that at the minimum, ''provision of least
cost housing will make certain that municipalities in 'growth' areas of this state do
not 'grow' only for the well-to ... do." /d. Thus, the court expressly rejects a "filter
down" or "trickle down" approach to providing housing for lower-income families,
noting that this theory is defective in light of the general trend of housing now being
built in suburban communities such as Mount Laurel Township to appreciate rather
than to become affordable over time for lower-income families. According to the court's
logic, ''Only if municipalities like Mount Laurel begin now to build lower income or
least cost housing will some part of their housing stock ever 'filter down' to New Jersey's
poorer families., !d. at 278, 456 A.2d at 452 (emphasis in original). It is not clear
why lower cost or least cost housing is expected to depreciate in value when other
housing has appreciated over time. The court's assumption is premised on continued
regulation by municipalities of resale price ceilings and rentals for housing built pursuant to Mount Laurel II. This, however, would present economic disincentives for
owners or developers to fully maintain and operate the housing in the first place, for
the same reasons that rent control, in general, has created disincentives for upkeep,
ownership and maintenance. See generally C. BAIRD, RENT CONTROL: THE PERENNIAL
FoLLY 54-81 (1980). See also J. FRIED, HousiNG CRISIS U.S.A. 35-39 (1971) (discussing
specific disincentives regarding New York's rent control experience); D. MANDELKER,
HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 19-20 (1973) (discussing specific
problems regarding England's rent control disincentives). For a general history of rent
control measures throughout the world, see 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
292-95 (1953).
53. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 258-60, 456 A.2d at 441-42.

.
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6. Potent Judicial Remedies for Municipal
Failure to Meet Mount Laurel Obligation
In the event that a municipality which includes a growth area or otherwise is subject to a Mount Laurel II obligation 54 is challenged in a lawsuit,
the trial judge ·will make a threshold determination of ultimate fact: whether
the zoning ordinance, taken together with any affirmative measures initiated
by the municipal government, provides a realistic opportunity for meeting the
municipality's fair share of the region's. present and prospective low- and
moderate-income housing needs. If the trial court makes a determination that
the municipal defendant has not ~atisfied its Mount Laurel obligation, the
court is required to order the municipality to revise its zoning ordinance, within
a specifie.d time period. 55 If the municipality fails to adequately revise its
ordinance within the specified period, the trial court must implement the following remedies for non-compliance. 56
54. Even though a municipality is not in a ''growth area" on the SDGP, it could
nevertheless be subject to a Mount Laurel obligation. See infra notes 236-50 and
accompanying text.
55. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278, 456 A.2d at 452.
56. ld. The court's opinion is confusing with regard to this initial time period
for municipal revision of a constitutionally infirm zoning ordinance and \Vhether a
master may be appointed by the trial court,. against the wishes of a municipal defendant, immediately following the judicial determination of ultimate fact that the
municipality has failed to meet its Mount Laurel obligation. The court, on the one
hand, clearly states that:
If a trial court determines that a municipality has not met its Mount Laurel
obligation, it shall order the municipality to revise its zoning ordinance within
a set time period to comply with the constitutional mandate; if the municipality
fails adequately to revise its ordinance within that time, the court shall in1plement the remedies for non-compliance outlined below. . . .

Id. (emphasis added). At first blush, it would seem that a municipality may be given
a flexible time period, set by the trial court, to modify its zoning ordinance on its
own initiative. This time period, subject to a reasonableness standard, might be several
months in duration. It would also seem from the above-quoted language that a trial
court would not have the discretion, immediately after its initial determination of noncompliance, to order a master to "assist" the municipality. A municipality; of course,
would have an economic incentive to avoid a master, since it would ultimately have
to pay for the master's services. See id. at 281 n.38, 45-6 A.2d at 453 n.38. However,
a later portion of the court's opinion confuses the holdings. Under the heading "Revision of the Zoning Ordinance: The Master," the court states:
If the trial court determines that a municipality's zoning ordinance does
not satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation, it shall order the defendant to revise
it. Unless it is clear that a requisite realistic opportunity can be otherwise
provided, the trial court should direct the municipality to incorporate in that
new ordinance· the affirmative devices discussed above most likely to lead
to the construction of lower income housing. The trial court shall order the
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Builder's remedy

This remedy allows a successful plaintiff builder to construct a project
which provides a substantial amount of lower-income housing on land owned
by the defendant municipality. It is granted by the trial court unless the
municipality ''establishes that because of environmental or other substantial
planning concerns, the plaintiff's proposed project is clearly contrary to sound
57
land use planning. '' Trial court determinations of whether a builder's remedy
should apply would be made on a case by case basis, 58 although the supreme
court, in expressly overruling a portion of its decision in Oakwood at Madison,
59
Inc. v. Township of Madison, stated that where the builder proposes a viable
project, the builder's remedy should be granted in order to make these remedies
more readily available. 60

(b)

Order to revise the zoning ordinance, order appointing a master

A trial judge faced with a non-complying municipal defendant is also given
authority under Mount Laurel II to (1) order the defendant to change its zoning ordinance by a date certain; (2) order that specific affirmative devices such
as mandatory set asides, subsidies, and other inclusionary zoning devices
previously discussed be incorporated into the new zoning ordinance; and (3)
order the appointment of a special master to assist municipal officials in
developing constitutional zoning and land use requirements. 61

(c) Remedies for municipal non-compliance with trial court order to revise
zoning ordinance
revision to be completed within 90 days of its original judgment against the
municipality. For good cause shown, a municipality may be granted an
extension of that time period .
. To facilitate this revision, the trial court may appoint a special master to
assist munic~pal officials in developing constitutional zoning and land use
regulations.
/d. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453 (emphasis added). The confusion between the two passages
of the opinion arises because the supreme court instructs the trial court to order completion of the revised zoning ordinance "within 90 days of its original judgment against
the municipality'' and allows the appointment of a master. However, such a construction directly contradicts the more flexible self-revised approach allowed by the first
passage.
57. !d. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.
58. While the textual discussion in Mount Laurel II does not contain the language
"case by case," the language is contained in the "Summary of Rulings." /d. at 218,
456 A.2d at 420. This is a recurrent problem in interpreting the Mount Laurel II opinion.
59. 72 N.J. 481, 551 n.50, 371 A.2d 1192, 1227 n.50 (1977).
60. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279, 456 A.2d at 452.
61. /d. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453. The master's services would be paid for by
the defendant municipality. /d. at 281 n.38, 456 A.2d at 453 n.38.
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In the event that a defendant municipality under an order to revise its
zoning ordinance either fails to submit a revised ordinance within the time
specified by the court order, or fails to satisfy the trial court that the revised
ordinance meets the Mount Laurel II obligation, the trial court has great judicial
power to force compliance by issuing such orders as are appropriate including
62
any one or more of the following:
•

(1) that the municipality adopt such resolutions and ordinances,
including particular amendments to its zoning ordinance, and other
land use regulations, as will enable it to meet its Mount Laurel
obligations;
(2) that certain types of proje_cts or construction as may be specified
by the trial court be delayed within the municipality until its ordinance
is satisfactorily revised, or until all or part of its fair share of lower
income housing is constructed and/or firm commitments for its construction have been made by responsible developers;
(3) that the zoning .o rdinance and the land use regulations of the
municipality be deemed void in whole or in part so as to relax or
eliminate building and use restrictions in all or selected portions of
the municipality (the court may condition this remedy upon failure
of the mu_n icipality to adopt resolutions or ordinances mentioned in
(1) above); and
(4) that particular applications to ·c onstruct housing that includes
lower income units be approved by the municipality, or any officer,
board, agency, authority (independent or otherwise) or division
thereof. 63

The supreme court acknowledged that the aforementioned coercive
remedial powers, authorized after previous court orders have been violated,
are more of an administrative and legislative nature than of a judicial nature,
and that these potential remedies go beyond the ken of traditional judicial
64
remedies. Moreover, basing its sweeping remedial changes on the mandate
of the New Jersey Constitution, the court frankly admits that it is risking
65
its judicial legitimacy with this mandate.
62. /d. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455. The court's language, "including any one
or more of the following," would seem to limit a trial court's discretion to the particular orders enumerated by the court. However, in light of the considerable discretion and power vested in Mount Laurel// trial courts by the supreme coures. opinion,
it is arguable that the court would tolerate other types_of coercive orders not specifically
enumerated in the opinion.
63. /d.
64. ld. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456.
65. /d. Compare this statement to the coures concern about its power to undertake unconventional remedies in institutional litigation. !d. at 288-90, 456 A.2d at 457-58.
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Modification of the Usual Appellate Rules
and Common Law Doctrine

The supreme court substantially modified the usual rules of appellate
procedure66 and the res judicata effect of compliance judgments 6 ' in future
Mount Laurel litigation. Regarding the former modification, the court held
68
that barring the most unusual circumstances, the judiciary should handle
Mount Laurel II cases to dispose of the litigation in all of its aspects with
one trial and one appeal with stays and interlocutory appeals being the rare
exception rather than the rule. 69 Thus, if a municipality takes an appeal, all
aspects of the case will be considered by the appellate court including both
the correctness of the lower court's decision on invalidity, the scope of the
remedies imposed on the municipality, and the validity of the ordinance adopted
70
after the determination of invalidity. The court chose to take this approach,
despite the prospect that if the appellate court finds that the trial court's initial determination of failure to comply with Mount Laurel was wrong from
the outset, ''all of the steps subsequently taken by the municipality to comply
71
. . . may have been wasted energy."
The second modification alters the usual rule that the common law doctrine of res judicata does not apply to all situations, such as a judicial determination of municipal compliance with its Mount Laurel obligation, where
circumstances may have changed after the date of entry of the judgment. The
court, borrowing the six year period for municipal reexamination and amend72
ment of its land use regulations set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law,
held that "[c]ompliance judgments in [Mount Laurel] cases . . . shall have
res judicata effect, despite changed circumstances, for a period of six years,

66. /d. at 290-91, 456 A.2d at 458. The greatest modification was in the area
of interlocutory appeals. The standard practice is to allow interlocutory appeals to
the appellate division or to the supreme court. See generally N.J. CT. R. 2:2-4, 2:2-5,
2:3-1, and 2:5-6 (1984). Moreover, pursuant to common law exceptions to the final
judgment rule, courts in the past have allowed appeals of orders which are apparently
interlocutory but actually final. See, e.g., Kriegsman v. Kriegsman, 150 N.J. Super.
474, 375 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1977) (a trial court order relieving or declining to relieve
counsel during the pendency of an action is appealable); State v. Evangelista, 134 N.J.
Super. 64, 338 A.2d 224 (Law Div. 1975) (an order of the juvenile court waiving its
jurisdiction is appealable). The court's modification of appellate procedures, however,
leaves intact the ability of a Mount Laurel II trial court to certify an interlocutory
order pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 4:42-2 (1984).
67. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 291-92, 456 A.2d at 459.
68. /d. at 290-91, 456 A.2d at 458.
69. /d. at 218, 456 A.2d at 420. The court's standard for allowing an exception
to its stay of an interlocutory appeal ruling is vague. See id.
70. /d.
71. /d. at 290, 456 A.2d at 458 (emphasis added).
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:660-1 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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the period to begin with the entry of judgment by the trial court. " 73 This
ruling, however, was weakened by the court's footnote reference that ''a
substantial transformation of the municipality ... may trigger a valid Mount
74
Laurel claim before the six years have expired. "
To summarize, the supreme court made radically new law in Mount Laurel
II in seven major holdings. Most significantly, the court replaced the ''developing municipality" standard with a new benchmark which looks to whether
any portion of a New Jersey municipality is in a "growth area" as designated
in the State Development Guide Plan; the court mandated that all municipalities
in the state, no matter what planning regions are designated in th~ SDG.P ,
must provide a realistic opportunity for housing for their indigenous poor;
and the court ruled that a defendant municipality can no longer escape the
imposition of judicial remedies in future Mount Laurel litigation by asserting
a good faith defense. The next three sections of this Article explore the secondorder consequences of Mount Laurel II.
II.

A..

SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES

Overview

Major judicial policy decisions such as Mount Laurel II involve secondary repercussions which are unanticipated and ignored in judicial monitoring and follow-up. These repercussions entail social costs that are more difficult to verify than the decision's intended benefits and cause widely borne
social costs which may surface much later than the ruling itself. Second-order
consequences also may have negative synergistic effects as one consequence
affects others. 75 Moreover, while an appellate court, such as the New Jersey
Supreme Court in its Mount Laurel II decision, might flag a number of potential effects in the course of its policymaking decision, these judicially
acknowledged repercussions may still constitute second-order consequences
when the full dimensions of the impact are not considered in the decision in
chief.
73. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 291-92, 456 A.2d at 459.
74. /d. at 292 n.44, 456 A.2d at 459 n.44 (emphasis added). The court presumed
a six-year period of municipal immunity from other Mount Laurel II suits following
a compliance judgment. The court ignored the fact that th~ six year planning cycle
could be substantially different from the six-year period following a judgment of compliance. For example, if a particular municipality adopted its original master plan on
January l, 1977, updated its master plan on January l, 1983, and obtained a compliance judgment in Mount Laurel II litigation on December 1, 1988, the municipality
would risk triggering the "substantial transformation" test by any revision of its master
plan on January 1, 1989, as scheduled. Thus, instead of having a six-year period of
repose from the date of the compliance judgment (December 1, 1988), the municipality
would face the prospect of having only a few months repose before another litigant
could challenge its master plan.
15. These effects might be termed third-order consequences. For purposes of
discussion, however, this Article labels all of the unforeseen consequences as secondorder consequences.
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So analyzed, a partial working inventory of potential second-order consequences of the Mount Laurel II decision is provided below. The listing is not
exhaustive, detailed or even accurately predictive. It is presented for heuristic
purposes only. Indeed, even if only a small percentage of the possible secondorder consequences of Mount Laurel II come to pass, significant social costs
will be incurred. After a brief sketch of land use and zoning changes effected
by Mount Laurel II, this Article will consider a more focused study of one
particular second-order consequence: the impact of the Mount Laurel II decision on future solar energy development in the state. 76 Other potential political,
economic and social second-orde-r consequences of the decision follow in Part
IV.

B.

Zoning and Land Use Consequences
1.

The Judiciary's Role as a Super-Zoning
Board will Vastly Increase.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has effectively judicialized zoning decisions on a statewide basis. The court's elaborate and forceful remedial holdings
create a standard of judicial review analogous to the ''hard look'' doctrine
77
in federal environmental litigation. Courts are admonished not to defer to
local land use decisions or consider a zoning challeng_e in isolation, but must
scrutinize the municipality's entire zoning ordinance, its regional effects and
78
any affirmative measures taken to construct lower-income housing. The ''hard
look" doctrine is applicable to both trial and appellate courts. 79
The three Mount Laurel judges selected to implement the mandate enjoy
extraordinary judicial powers-,_akin to independent agency commissioners with
wide responsibilities to implement a specific piece of legislation. Simultaneously,
the supreme court encouraged these judges to impose freely precise zoning
76. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
77. Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia originated the "hard look" doctrine in Environmental Defense Fund,- Inc~
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Reviewing the Secretary of Agriculture's
refusal to suspend or commence proceedings to suspend the registration of the pesti~ide
DDT, the court of appeals determined that a stricter standard of review was required
in environmental litigation. Judge Bazelon observed that matters which touch on "fundamental personal interest in life, health and liberty . . . have always had a special
claim to judicial protection" and remanded the matter for further proceedings. ld.
at 598. The court of appeals' expression was reiterated by the United States Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), where the
Court addressed the Secretary of Transportation's scope of authority under the Federal
Aid Highway Act of 1966; 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-141 (Supp. V 1984). The Court indicated
that its review was to be "thorough, probing and in...depth." 401 U.S~ at 415. Both courts
emphasized the special nature of environmental matters as reasons for expanding the
scope of courts' review. A-p parently, the special need for low-income housing in this
state also justified the state supreme court's stricter standard of review.
78. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 281-85, 456 A.2d at 453 .. 55.
79. See id. at 218, 290, 456 A.2d at 420, 458-59.
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ordinances, to solicit vigorously the involvement of hybrid masters and other
experts, and to become involved generally with the details of local land use
planning. 80
That judges' decisions regarding pertinent regions and regional need are
81
binding on non-party municipalities within that region closely resembles the
rulemaking powers of an administrative agency. Indeed, this Judicial power
goes beyond the model of agency rulemaking since the Mount Laurel judges
are not expressly required to provide notice or an opportunity for comment
82
to affected municipalities. Trial courts may alter the SDGP determination
through which municipalities are subject to a regional fair share obligation
by allowing the Mount Laurel courts to reclassify a municipality if it encourages
or allows growth. 83 If the SDGP is not revised after January 1, 1985, the special
courts will have ''considerable discretion'' to vary the contours of the SDGP. 84
Thus, given strict scrutiny of municipal zoning ordinances and greatly increased
judicial power to enforce compliance and alter SDGP planning determinations, the judiciary \viii be setting important details of land use ordinances
in the state.

2. Land Use Decisionmaking Has Been Forcibly
Shifted from Decentralized to Centralized Control.
In Mount Laurel II the supreme court elevated the importance of centrally
promulgated, regional and statewide master plans despite the absence of persuasive legislative ~nd administrative authority to justify this action. 85 In the
process the court debased the value of municipal master plans, which, according to the court's reasoning, are now subject to preemptive override by conflicting centrally developed state planning documents. Moreover, the SDGP
has apparently been given primacy over other conflicting state-developed or
regionally-developed plans .
The supreme court's interpretation of the legislature's intent in passing
86
the statute establishing the role of the Division of State and Regional Planning in the Department of Community Affairs can be accurately described as
80. See id. at 245-46, 253-55, 456 A.2d at 434-35, 439-40.
81. /d. at 254, 456 A.2d at 439. While the court indicates that non-party
municipalities may attempt to intervene or the court may require their joinder, it seems
that the language of the supreme court's opinion discourages such joinder or intervention because it may complicate the litigation. /d. Moreover, the supreme court leaves
it to the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a non~party municipality
will be allowed to intervene. Fundamental rules of r~s judicata and collateral estoppel
dictate that if a non-party municipality will be bound by a determination of region
and regional housing needs, it must have the right to intervene.
82. /d.
83. ld. at 241-42:, 248 n.2l, 456 A.2d at 432-33, 435 n.2l.
84. Id. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33.
85. See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § ll:lB-15.52 (West 1979).
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a double extrapolation. The court extended the legislature's purposes in enacting the Department's enabling statute and extended the purposes of the Division of State and Regional Planning in writing the SDGP. In reviewing the
enabling act in juxtaposition with the SDGP, the court created new common
law by analogous reasoning from non-judicial sources. 87
Contrary to the supreme court's expansive and far-ranging interpretation,
the legislature did not mandate or intend a ''statewide blueprint for future
development" 88 when it charged the Division of State and Regional Planning
with ''preparing and maintaining a comprehensive guide plan and long term
development and capital improvement program for the future improvement
and development of the State. " 89 Nor did the legislature mandate or intend
the SDGP as a document that must be used for the purpose of deciding where
growth should be encouraged, discouraged, permitted and prohibited in New
90
Jersey. A more reasonable interpretation of the 1961 enabling statute would
have viewed it as a legislative request for administrative development of
information to be used by local, state and federal officials to coordinate planning efforts and promote sensible and efficient land use policies. The court
overstates the agency interpretation given by the Division of State and Regional
Planning to the enabling act as requiring ''a plan that would guide and influence
the location of future development, including residential development. '' 91 The
SDGP recommends where future development and conservation efforts in New
Jersey should be concentrated. The SDGP did recognize that while it might
have some indirect impact on social, economic and psychological goals, it is
essentially an advocacy plan for the preservation and efficient use of the State's
physical resources. However, "it functions by recommending where growthinducing investments should and should not be made so that these resources
are used efficiently to achieve fundamental statewide goals. " 92 Thus, the SDGP
•

87. There is a tradition of utilizing non-judicial sources, particularly statutes,
as material for growth and development of the common law. See generally Landis,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 213 (1934); Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 11-14 (1936); Traynor, Statutes
Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 401, 405-26 (1968). See also
R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 121-26 (1974).
88. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423.
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.52(a)(2) (West 1979).
90. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 230, 456 Aw2d at 426.
91. /d. at 227, 456 A.2d at 425.
92. DIVISION OF STATE & REGIONAL PLANNING, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CoMMUNITY AFFAJRS, STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN ii-iv (May 1980) [hereinafter cited
as STATE DEVELOPMENT GuiDE PLAN]. The Guide Plan states that it
provides a long-range, statewide perspective which transcends functional and
departmental lines. It is designed to assist the Governor's Office of Policy
and Planning and the v~rious Cabinet Committees it serves, as well as other
agencies of government. In the final analysis implementation of the Guide
Plan will depend upon its utility to those agencies and the extent to which

•

•
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is, at best, equivocal about whether it was to be a binding regional blueprint
for determining the appropriateness of publicly funded, growth-inducing
developments such as highways and sewers. The SDGP states that the intention of the Division of Planning was that the Guide Plan be used in functional
planning by State agencies, that county, regional and federal agencies take
into account the plans, concept, and that some progress be made toward
93
establishing a unified statewide land use and investment policy .
The legislature did not view the SDGP as a top-to-bottom legislative man94
date of where future growth and development should or should not take place.
It is reasonable to conclude that both the legislative and executive branches
envisioned that primary prescriptive land use decisionmaking would continue
on a local, decentralized basis, albeit with municipal consideration of the relationship of the proposed development of the municipality, as articulated in
its master plan, to the master plans of contiguous municipalities, the master
its recommendations are expressed in the programs and policies of the State
government.
/d. at iv.
93. /d. at iii. While housing and residential development is discussed in the STATE
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, the analysis is theoretical and general rather than prescriptive
and detailed. Indeed, the problem of lower-income housing was presented in extremely
vague terms:

Suburbanization and the shift of employment locations to areas outside
the central cities have led to problems of restricted housing opportunities for
some income groups.. Many New Jersey residents, particularly low- and
moderate-income families, have difficulty in finding affordable housing near
their jobs. Recognizing this problem, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
1975 Mount Laurel decision held that all "developing" municipalities should
provide opportunities for a "fair share" of regional housing needs within
their borders. However, the impact of this and subsequent decisions, at least
at the present time and in view of the economic constraints, has been minimal.
A major challenge in the coming years will be to provide a variety of housing opportunities in appropriate locations for New Jersey's expanding population. Single persons and young couples, families with growing children, and
the elderly all have different housing needs and tastes. The economics of the
housing market requires efforts by both the State and the Nation. Solutions
to the problems of the cost, variety and location of new housing will have
to be found if present and future residents are to enjoy decent homes in good
residential environments.
STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 6-7.
94. A single exception to this statement would be with regard to environmentally
critical areas, to wit, the Pinelands and the coastal zone. In these areas the State clearly
did indicate a top-to-bottom legislative mandate of where and how development should
take place. This had already been done in other statutes. See Pinelands Protection Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ l3:18A-l to -29 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); Hackensack Meadowlands
Reclamation and Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West 1979);
Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979).
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plan of the county in which the municipality is located and any comprehensive guide plan formulated under the statute. 95
In making the SDGP the centerpiece of its reconstituted constitutional
doctrine, the supreme court converted a voluntary informational and
coordinating guide for state, county, and local officials into an involuntary
blueprint for municipal development mandated by the state. While the court
noted that the SDGP may become ''inappropriate" for continued use as a
96
standard for determining constitutional obligation, the pragmatic reality is
that municipalities who spurn the SDGP after Mount Laurel II will do so
at their own peril. Regardless of whether the SDGP was a voluntary guide
for municipal consideration before the supreme court's ruling, it is now a binding mandate caught up in the very fabric of the court's constitutional remedy
in Mount Laurel II.
Repercussions of the decision go beyond usurpation of municipal autonomy
and derogation of legislative intent. Mount Laurel// will also have a tendency
to interfere with intra-executive policymaking by virtue of the planning primacy
the decision accords to the SDGP developed by the Department of Community
Affairs. Indeed, that Department might interpret the court's far-ranging dicta
to justify a decision to overrule a planning decision by a sister agency of state
government such as the Departments of Energy, Transportation or Agriculture.
Mount Laurel II also undermines some policy assumptions made by the professional planners who wrote the SDGP. The SDGP planners did not know
that their designation of growth areas would trigger affirmative municipal
obligations to provide thousands of units of lower-income housing on a
97
statewide basis. The mapping of growth areas by the Department might have
been different had this requirement been an explicit part of the planning
98
99
process. Population projections for the state, urban strategy, and assump-

95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-28(d) (West 1979). This statute was partially quoted
by the Mount Laurel II court. 92 N.J. at 228, 456 A.2d at 425. Indeed, in a paradoxical admission at the end of its review and amplification of the STATE DEVELOPMENT
GuiDE PLAN, the Mount Laurel court notes the essentially non-binding, voluntary nature
of the STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN:
Except for protective legislation (such as that pertaining to the Pinelands and
certain coastal areas) limited to particular ecologically sensitive areas, the state
has imposed no prescriptions against development. While conformity of the
constitutional obligation to the design of the Plan unquestionably advances
the state's purposes, the absence of such prescription against development
may, in the long run, undermine the regional planning objectives of the SDGP,
whether we limit the Mount Laurel obligation to growth areas or not.
92 N.J. at 247-48, 456 A.2d at 435 (emphasis added).
96. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
97. See STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 6.
98. !d. at 2-5.
99. Id. at 15-16.
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100

tions about infrastructure development might also have been fundamentally
different. While the court left open the opportunity for the Department to
101
modify the SDGP in the future, such court-sanctioned modification, linked
as it is to municipal constitutional obligation, destabilizes long-range municipal
fiscal planning and municipal assessment of legal responsibilities to zone for
lower-income housing.
3. Important Purposes of Zoning Outside of
"Health and Safety" Considerations will be Eclipsed.
The bedrock constitutional responsibility of growing municipalities in taking steps to comply with Mount Laurel II is the removal of zoning and subdivision restrictions and exactions that are not necessary to protect health and
102
safety.
While the court indicates that once compliance with Mount Laurel
II is assured, a municipality may undertake other "restrictive provisions
103
incompatible with lower income housing,''
the court creates doubt about
the continued validity and scope of other ''general welfare'' purposes of zon104
ing such as energy, aesthetics and historical preservation.
ln discussing municipal zoning responsibilities regarding mobile homes,
for example, the court ambiguously states that it recognizes the propriety of
aesthetic considerations in zoning, but that "the 'subjective sensibilities' of
present residents are not a sufficient basis for the exclusion of the poor.'' 1os
Taken together with its admonition for municipalities to eliminate all restrictive and cost generating exactions not necessary for health and safety, 106 it
would seem that the court has eliminated aesthetic zoning as well as other
"general welfare" objectives such as energy conservation and historical preservation from zones set aside for lower-income housing. Because municipal compliance with Mount Laurel II will often involve overzoning for low- and
107
moderate-income housing, it is apparent that the court has relegated "general
welfare'' zoning purposes to an inferior status. Moreover, since a municipality
will not know whether it is in compliance with Mount Laurel II until it is
100. /d. at 16-17.
101. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33.
102. See id. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441.
103 . .I d. at 259-60, 456 A.2d at 442.
104. Compare Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441 with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:550,.2 (West 1983) (legislative purposes of zoning and planning). This list
of legislatively sanctioned zoning and planning purposes comprises a wide variety of
general welfare purposes, contrary to the supreme court's narrowing of permissible
zoning actions, under Mount Laurel II, to health and safety purposes.
105. Mount Laurel//., 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451 (citing Vickers v. Township
Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 269, 181 A.2d 129, 149-50 (1962) (Hall,
J., dissenting)).
106. /d. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441.
107. !d. at 262 n.26, 456 A.2d at 453 n.26 (citing Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 48},, 519, 371 A.2d 1192, 1210-11 (1977)).
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challenged in court, and is subject to future suit notwithstanding an existing
judgment for compliance, prudent zoning policy would dictate the eschewal
of "general welfare" zoning purposes such as aesthetics, energy, and historical
preservation, since these might be considered to be exclusionary zoning devices
108
by a court.
4. The Directive to Eliminate Cost Generating
.M unicipal Housing Regulation Ignores Long-Range
Life-Cycle Cost Savings of Many Construction Practices.
The supreme court's absolute insistence on municipal elimination of costgenerating building standards and exactions, unnecessary for health and safety,
ignores the fundamental economic reality that some building improvements,
while initially cheaper, are more costly over the life of the building than other
improvements. This concept is particularly true with regard to a building's
09
energy system, • but is also applicable to exterior improvements that may
have to be replaced prematurely because of shoddiness in original
110
construction.

5.

Increased Density Will Cause Substantial
Ripple Effects in Many Areas.

Increased density in housing development is a central concept in the court's
mandate that municipalities undertake affirmative measures to assure the construction of their fair share of lower-.income regional housing. Widespread
municipal use of density bonuses, leading to too-intensive development could,
however, have several unintended negative effects. First, too high densities
111
can have an adverse impact on the psychological well-being of residents.
Second, over-intensive development can cause accelerated deterioration of
11 2
physical facilities and supporting infrastructure.
Third, too dense development can result in an ugly, aesthetically unappealing appearancel' Finally, as
discussed in greater detail in Part III, modern and efficient alternative energy
designs for homes require reasonable access to sunlight and minimization
of
•
108. The court's statement that it did not intend the opinion to result ·i n environmentally harmful consequences, and that its concern for protection of the environment
is a strong one, is inextricably linked to health and safety concerns. 92 N.J. at 331
n .. 68, 456 A.2d at 479~80 n.68 (citing Mount Laurel!, 61 N.J. at 186-87, 336 A.2d
at 173). Indeed, the ·c ourt implied as much in stating that "[w]here a particular proposed lower income development will result in substantial environmental degradation,
such a development should not be required or encouraged." !d.
109;; See generally N. SHAW & J. BAUER, A NEW JERSEYAN's CoNSUMER GuiDE
TO SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS: WITH AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 114 (1978). See· a/so infra
note 156 and accompanying text.
110. Bernstein, Why Mount Laurel Won,t Work . .. Unless, STATE BAR MouNT
LAUREL II REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-5.
Ill. ld.
112. ld.
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northern exposures. Over-intensive development could stifle and discourage
such energy planning.

III.

IMPLICATIONS OF

Mount Laurel II

FuTURE SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN

A.

ON

NEw

JERSEY

National and Statewide Importance of Solar Energy Development

With lower short-term oil prices and better supply, policymakers may forget
the American imperative to take intelligent steps toward a more balanced system
of energy sources instead of continuing to rely on imported oil. 113 Yet rational
114
energy development is still the ''moral equivalent of war,'' and there is wide
consensus that energy independence is one of our nation's most important
115
long-range priorities.
Of all the potential options in managing this necessary national transition
from energy dependence to energy autonomy, solar energy and conservation
are the most promising. According to experts at the Harvard Business School's
Energy Project, domestic oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear energy cannot deliver
vastly increased supplies in future years, although these traditional energy
sources cannot be ignored. 116 The Harvard report concludes that America has
only two major alternatives for the rest of this century
"to import more
1 17
oil or to accelerate the development of conservation and solar energy.'' This
Article will focus on residential solar space and hot water heating.
113. See

OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD
BusiNEss SCHOOL 216 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin, eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
fUTURE].
114. I PUB. PAPERS 656 (Apr. 18, 1977) (President Carter).
115. See generally sources collected and cited in ENERGY FuTURE, supra note 1! 3.
116. /d. at 216.
117. /d. Solar energy is not a single homogenous energy source, but a generic
term that covers a variety of renewable energy technologies, some modern and some
ancient. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, these are: (1) thermal, including
heating and cooling of buildings and hot water and agricultural and industrial process
heating; (2) fuels from biomass, including wood and waste; and (3) solar electricity,
including photovoltaic (solar cell), wind, hydro·power and solar and ocean thermal
applications. See ENERGY FuTuRE, supra note 113, at 184.
For general background information on the unique opportunities as well as obstacles
for increased solar energy development in the United States, see L. Corr, WIND ENERGY:
LEGAL ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979);
G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAW: PROTECTING ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT FOR SOLAR ENERGY
SYSTEMS (l979); S. JOHNSON, A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO SOLAR ENERGY
INCENTIVES (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979); J. LAITOS, EcoNOMIC AND
REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY UTILITY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND DECENTRALIZED
SoLAR APPLICATIONS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1981 ); J. LAITos & R. FEVERSTEIN, REGULATED UTniTIES AND SOLAR ENERGY: A LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
MAJOR IssUEs AFFECTING THE SOLAR Co:MMERCIALIZATION EFFORT (Solar Energy Research
Institute, 1980); J. OVERDORF, LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM PASSIVE SOLAR ENERGY
ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT

.
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Solar space heating is the most mature form of solar technology.
It
is largely an ''on site'' technology: the heating system is designed for a given
structure or small group of structures. In contrast, other solar technologies
are more centralized and capable of delivering energy to a larger number of
buildings. Examples of the latter type include solar thermal electric, ocean
thermal electric and hydropower dams.
Solar heating can be further subdivided into ''passive" and ''active''
technologies. Passive solar energy relies on energy conscious architecture and
design, rather than on an actual heat storage and distribution system. Thus,
a passive solar home has no moving parts; its heating "system" consists of
a massive south-facing wall with large double-paned windows combined with
improved conservation technologies. The massive wall absorbs sunlight
throughout the day and releases heat at night to provide a continuously warm
. air temperature in the home. Active solar heating, on the other hand, involves
mechanical moving parts such as solar collectors that heat air or water which
moves through pipes. The air or water is then fanned or pumped through
a heat exchanger in a water-filled storage tank. This hot water can be used
to heat the house directly or can heat the house by pumping it through a
radiator.
Energy experts agree that solar heating could significantly decrease the
119
United States' consumption of other sources of energy during this decade,
12
and by the end of the twentieth century. ° For most of this decade, solar
heating is expected to have its principal effect in the form of active systems,
especially for heating water. 121 More importantly, its major impact, if allowed
to develop fully, would be <?n new structures. Passive solar technology is most
efficient and is easily incorporated in new _c onstruction at little or no extra
122
cost. Retrofits onto existing buildings, on the other hand, are more expensive.
The same is true of active solar systems, although they do add to the price
of a new home.
Solar and energy conserving new construction is especially important for
New Jersey for several reasons. First, the ramifications of the increases in
the price of oil and petroleum products are felt more severely in New Jersey
12 3
than elsewhere because the state is exceptionally dependent on petroleum.
New Jersey is also more dependent on foreign-produced oil than the nation
118

SYSTEMS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1980); P. SPIVAK, LAND-USE BARRIERS AND
INCENTIVES TO THE UsE OF SOLAR ENERGY (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979);
W. THOMAS & A. MILLER, OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR
ENERGY SYSTEMS ( 197 8).
118. See ENERGY FUTURE; supra note 113, at 186.
119. !d.
120. SeeS. KRAEMER, SoLAR LAw 1 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SoLAR LAw].
121. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 113, at 187.
122. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE NEW JERSEY ENERGY MASTER PLAN
6 (Oct. 1978) (hereinafter cited as ENERGY MASTER PLAN].
123. /d.
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124

as a whole.
According to the New Jersey Department of Energy, about
twenty-eight percent of the petroleum used in New Jersey in 1980 was used
by the residential and commercial sectors for heating and another five percent
125
by the industrial sector for heating.
The Department of Energy estimates
that by the year 2000 solar energy could produce twenty-five million British
thermal units (Btus) annually, and that figure could be substantially increased
by, among other things, governmental policies to encourage the use of solar
energy. 126 Further, the Department pointed out that the solar energy industry
is relatively inflation~proof and generates jobs while keeping consumers' energy
dollars in the local economy. 121
According to pre-Mount Laurel II estimates by the New Jersey Department of Energy, at least seve.n ty-five percent of the approximately 400,000
new single family homes that will be built in New Jersey between 1985 and
2000 could have solar hot water systems; fifty percent of those homes could
integrate passive solar heating techniques; an additional ten percent could have
active solar heating systems. 12·8 Finally, state energy officials estimate that at
least ten percent of the industrial and commercial establishments in existence
in the year 2000 could use solar energy. 129 If these projections are accurate,
twenty-five million Btus of energy would be produced in New Jersey annually. 130
.

B.

.

.

The New Jersey Energy Master Plan

In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature, finding that the state was threatened
131
by the prospect of both short- and long-term energy shortages, statutorily
created a cabinet-level Department of Energy to ensure the wise and efficient
132
production, distribution, use and conservation of energy.
In passing this
statute, the legislature expressly delegated to the Department broad powers
to conduct and implement emergency and long-range planning. These
administrative responsibilities included the development of a ten-year Energy
Master Plan to be periodically updated. 133 The legislature required the newlyformed Department of Energy to promulgate this Master Plan within a year
of the passage of the enabling act. To this end, the Department was given
•

124. /d. at 7.
125. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ENERGY
MASTER PLAN 1981, at B-19 (hereinafter cited as 1981 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
126. /d.
,
127. /d. Currently, about 980Jo of a New Jerseyan,s dollar spent on energy goes
out of state, and some portion of that out of the country. This is a severe drain on
our local economy. See id. at C-24.
128. /d. at B-19.
129. /d.
130. /d.
131. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
132. See id. § 52:27F-4.
133. Id. § 52:27F-14. See generally ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122.
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power to colle·c t a wide range of energy information necessary to carry out
its responsibilities.t 34 The legislature also granted standing to the Department
to intervene in any proceeding involving the control, production, transmission, use, or storage of any form ofenergy. 05 Other state regulatory agencies
were required to give the Department notice of any proceeding which might
affect the goals or implementation of the Energy Master Plan; the legislative
scheme placed the burde·n on New Jersey regulatory agencies to bring state·
government plans, projects, and regulations into conformance with this Plan.' 36
In 1978, the Department, after several public hearings, issued the Energy
Master Plan. The Plan detailed the past major energy transitions: from the
use of wood, water wheels and windmills to coal, and from coal to petroleum
and natural gas. According to the Plan, what might have been the third
transition
to nuclear power
appears to have been largely interrupte_d
by environmental and safety regulatory delays, greatly increased costs, and
slowed consumption of energy. 137 The third necessary transition, then, was
thought to be from petroleum to a mix of fuels. The Plan specifically called
for a diversification of the state's energy resources to include conservation
138
and renewable energy sources such as solar energy.
New Jersey's Energy Master Plan outlined three major goals: to assure
uninterrupted energy supply to all users; to promote economic growth while
safeguarding environmental quality; and to encourage the lowest possible energy
139
cost consistent with the conversation and efficient use of energy.
The
Department of Energy wrote several policy papers to detail how it intended
to meet these goals. The conservation policies focused on six critical areas
where conservation could substantially reduce energy use: residential, commercial and industrial conservation programs, electric and gas prices, and
140
transportation patterns.
The Department also called for energy impact
information to be included in existing state permit applications, and ruled that
it play a direct role in the approvals of large developments and projects, by
requiring large developers to file a statement for departmental review indicating
the type and extent of fuel usage proposed. 141 The Plan advised that local
planning boards retain the responsibility of determining the energy impact of
purely local construction.l 42
As for New Jersey's indigenous sources of energy, the Department focused
on solar energy and solid waste as the two most promising and significant
'

'

'

'

134. ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 1.
135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-15 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
136. The Department also has co-equal jurisdiction to site energy facilities and
authority to set energy prices and conduct res_earch and development projects. ld.
137. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 3-6.
138. /d. at 11.
139. /d. at 13.
140. See id. at 20-30.
141. !d. at 23.
142. Id.
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rene,wable resources. The Plan determined that both solar energy and solid
waste energy were technologically and economically feasible and have great
143
continuing potential as alternatives to existing sources of energy. The Department of Energy, therefore, recommended a state solar policy with a three-fold
purpose: to provide incentives to a growing solar industry while allowing the
market system to prove the cost-effectiveness of solar technology;, to ensure
the reliability of solar systems; and to incorporate consideration of solar energy
144
systems in building and land us.e and development throughout New Jersey.
The Master Plan emphasized that the Department would und-e rtake a
planning assistance program to work with municipal and zoning boards in
drafting solar elements in the municipal master plans required by the Municipal
Land Use Law, to review and formulate changes in the Uniform Construction
Code, us to promote solar systems, to consider legislation guaranteeing sunlight
access for solar users, and to encourage financial incentives to promote the
146
use of solar systems. Among the regulations adopted pursuant to this Plan
was a joint regulation by the New Jersey Departments of Energy and
Environmental Protection requiring all applicants for permits to build in the
state's coastal area to demonstrate why passive and active solar designs were
147
not applicable for the proposed project.
In proposed amendments to the Energy Master Plan released for public
hearings in 1981, the Department proposed that municipalities and county
governments play much stronger roles in conserving energy and promoting
solar energy through the land use planning process and municipal master
148
plans.
In 1980, the legislature had already required that municipalities and
county governments enact ordinances concerning site plans or subdivisions
that would require that streets be oriented to permit buildings to maximize
solar gain. 149 The Department outlined what a municipal energy master plan
should include beyond street and building orientation and also called for increasing densities near urban areas, employment centers, and transit lines to
reduce trip lengths, wasteful infrastructure development and unnecessary energy
transmission costs_ Further suggested local planning considerations included
the following: solar envelope zoning; rezoning multi-family and attached housing; cluster development with mixed uses (residential, commercial and industrial); and discouragement of strip development, infill, non-contiguous
development and wide streets. 15 ~ The Master Plan amendments expressly call
----------------------------~-----------------------------·-

Id. at 32-38.
Id. at 35-36.
N,. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-119 to -151 (West Supp. 1984--1985).
ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 36.
/d. at 42.
See 1981 AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-24 to C-32.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-38(b)(2) (WeS,t Supp. 1984-1985); 1981 PRoPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-25 to C-26.
150. See 1981 PRoPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-25 to C-31. Multi143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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for municipalities to locate new residential, industrial and commercial development in older, developed areas. This makes use of the existing infrastructure
and mass transit to reduce energy consumption in the transportation sector,
which uses about forty-five percent of the petroleum consumed in the state.•s•
New Jersey's municipalities face a legal dilemma. Given the express intent
of the legislature that other agencies
including municipalities in their zoning
adhere to the state Energy Master Plan •52 and further legislation calling
for zoning regulations and subdivision site plan ordinances to implement a
solar and conservation construction strategy, 153 local governments should begin
to reject builders' plans which do not at least call for street and house orientation to maximize solar utilization. Yet, in carrying out this responsibility, and
in exercising legislatively delegated powers to actively encourage solar e~ergy
use, after Mount Laurel II municipalities will subject themselves to suit for
having added to the cost of housing, as though zoning for a solar future were
an exclusionary device.
To avoid this regressive result, the SDGP must be revised to fully incorporate the Energy Master Plan. Municipalities attempting to fulfill their Mount
Laurel II obligation would then clearly have to consider the long-term cost
effectiveness of solar energy. The Energy Master Plan could be incorporated
into the SDGP when it is revised as part of its triennial update. Finally, Mount
Laurel judges and the state supreme court must become aware of the great
need and P.Otential for energy conservation and solar energy in new construction, the ease with which this goal could be accomplished or upset, and the
need to retrofit our urban and developed suburban houses with solar systems,
to the extent possible, to move toward an energy self-sufficient New Jersey.
If the bench, bar and builders are educated about solar energy this goal will
be realized in a way that includes the poor, who are currently excluded from
154
the solar future because of the relatively high initial cost of solar systems.
As seen in the next part of this Article, these high costs have been the result
of unnecessary obstacles to solar energy use.

C.

Solar Energy Development: A Legacy of Barriers
Unlike traditional sources of energy, some of which have received exten-

family and attached housing, for example, saves 30 to 600Jo of the heating and cooling
requirements of a single family house. /d. at C-27.
151. /d. at C-28.
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-15 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-38 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
154. The relative cost of solar energy as compared to other fuels is distorted by
the subsidization received by the more traditional energy sources. Price controls and
other regulations keep the cost of oil, gas, coal and uranium far below their economic
values. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note lll, at 225 . . 26. Thus, solar energy, which is practically unsubsidized, is placed at a competitive disadvantage. Recent state and federal
enactments providing financial incentives to solar energy users have slightly reduced
this price distortion. See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
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sive federal government aid to stimulate growth, solar energy development
in the United States has been stymied as a result of a variety of imposing
barriers~ These barriers fall into three major categories: economic, institutional
and legal.
.

.

1.

Economic Barriers

The critical economic barrier to the development of solar energy is the
perception by possible buyers of active solar heating, especially in retrofit situations, that the dollars spent on installing a system will not be recouped in
1
future fuel savings. ss This is a false perception: potential consumers fail to
appreciate that their initially high solar investment will not only be recouped
in future fuel savings, but the solar system will actually start earning money
for its owners. That is, an active solar system's life cycle cost, consisting of
installation and fuel expenses over the system's lifetime, is much less expensive than the life cycle costs of traditionally fueled heating systems. 156
The cost of borrowing money to pay for solar heating technology is another
economic barrier. An individual will have to pay interest rates up to twenty
percent higher to save a kilowatt through solar energy than to add a kilowatt
of capacity through utilities. is? The installation of solar heating may also
increase the value of a building with the consequence of increasing property
158
taxes.
Solar users in New Jersey, however, will pay no sales or increased
property taxes on solar systems until at least 1988.1 59'
2.

Institutional Barrie.rs

Some problems are the result of misperceptions. Also, the lack of technical
skills in installing and maintaining solar systems has created reliability problems
in system performance,. This, in turn, may dissuade otherwise interested
customers from installing solar equipment. 160 A substantial portion of the
potential market for solar heating technology lacks basic understanding; of
the effectiveness and operation of solar equipment. 161 Moreover, many potential consumers still perceive the use of solar technology as an elitist phenomenon
162
due to its high price.
Other problems are more institutional in nature. For instance, since solar
heating systems usually require back-up heating systems, fueled by traditional
fuels, cooperation with utilities is essential. Many utilities have seen solar

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

supra note 113, at 191-92.
SoLAR LAW, supra note 120, at 3.
ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 113, at 193.
ENERGY FuTURE,

/d.

See N.J.

ANN.§ 54:328-8.33 (West Supp. 1984-1985); see infra note 194.
ENERGY FuTURE, supra note 113, at 194.
161. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-2.
162. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra, note 113, at 191.
STAT.
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heating as competing with their own role as producers and converters of energy.
Other utilities view solar energy as a threat to their self-defined growth
163
programs. The utility rate structure may also deter solar use since it is usually
based on average cost category use or on volume of usage, rewarding energy
waste rather than conservation. 164
Solar research has traditionally been given a small research and development budget by both government and industry. Total federal funding for solar
programs was less than $100,000 per year before 1972. 165 While federal solar
funding increased in the late 1970's under President Carter, the Reagan
Administration has reduced the already small solar and wind portion of the
166
federal energy budget by sixty percent. Yet for many years, traditional forms
of energy have been substantially supported by direct and indirect subsidies
such as the oil depletion allowance and massive government investment in
nuclear energy research and development. If the federal government withdrew
from these other traditional sectors of the energy business, or if solar energy
were subsidized to the same degree as the traditionally subsidized sources of
energy, solar energy could compete on a true cost basis in the energy
167
marketplace.
3.

Legal Obstacles

A variety of legal impediments have plagued the widespread use of solar
heating technology in existing and new buildings. The most significant barriers are municipal zoning laws and procedures which place limits on the location and use of solar collectors, the materials of which they can be made,
and the physical dimensions of the equipment. State and local building codes
which create arbitrary engineering requirements regarding structural elements
of solar equipment, inappropriate plumbing and heating performance standards, and capricious limitations on the integration of solar collectors into
168
structures also impede the use of solar systems. Other barriers include private
covenants and easements which seek to limit the use of solar collectors in new
or existing structures, denial of injunctive relief in support of continued uninterrupted access to sunlight for landowners with in-place solar collectors on their
buildings, arbitrary state and federal tax regulations which tax solar systems
as property improvements, tax the purchase of solar systems, and allow no
income tax deduction or credit for purchase; and the uncertain legal status
regarding the ability to convey solar air space rights by neighboring property
owners. 169
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

/d. at 195.
See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-2.
See id. at G-3.
SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 3.

See id.
See id. at 237.
See id.
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D. Incentives for Solar Energy Development in New Jersey:
Before Mount Laurel II
1.

General Financial and Use Incentives

During the 1970's, federal legislation was passed to remove some of the
previously discussed financial barriers which inhibit solar energy development
in the United States. In three separate acts, Congress provided modest financial support for solar energy research and development, and modest tax breaks
for individual$ who installed solar heating equipment on their principal
residences. These were the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of
170
1974
(providing limited funds for solar research and development), the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 171 (designed to set standards
and provide loans, audits and grants for energy conservation and buildings),
and solar tax provisions of the Energy Tax Act of 1978 172 (allowing a qualified
renewable energy source expenditure credit and qualified energy conservation
expenditure credit for an individual's principal residence).
The New Jersey Legislature followed the federal lead by removing some
of the financial barriers to the use of solar heating equipment on individual
residences in the state. State tax legislation exempted active and passive solar
systems from inclusion in the assessed value of real property for real estate
taxation purposes, i 73 and another statute stipulated that qualified solar energy
equipment is exempt from the state sales tax. 174 The state Solar Easement Act, 175
passed in 1978, allows for the making and recording of solar airspace easements
over another's land by describing vertical and horizontal angles from a solar
collector or wall. 176
While these state laws provided a promising start for incentives to support solar energy on a par with traditional energy sources, New Jersey has
lagged behind other states' efforts to financially encourage the growth and
expansion of solar energy. 171 The State Uniform Construction Code Act, 178

170. Pub. L. No. 93-409, 88 Stat. 1069 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U .S.C.
§§ 2473(b), 5501-5517 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
171. Pub. L. No. 95-119, 92 Stat. 3282 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8201-8278 (1982)).
172. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3175 (1978) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 44C (1982)).
173. N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 54:4-3.113 to -3.120 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
174. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.33 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
175. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3-24 to 3-26 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
176. At least one commentator has criticized the general format of New Jersey's
solar easement law, which is patterned after Colorado's law, as being too restrictive
in requiring precise vertical and horizontal angles. See SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 41.
177. Other states have taken innovative actions to encourage solar energy use and
development. See SoLAR ENERGY REsEARCH INSTITUTE, U.S. DEP'T oF ENERGY,
A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES (1979).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-119 to -151 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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statutory and case law that allows utility rate discrimination against users of
solar energy systems needing traditional energy backup, •79 and the lack of
statutory life cycle cost approaches to public construction investment
180
decisions still financially impede reasonable solar energy use in New Jersey.
2.

Land Use Incentives

The Municipal Land Use Law of 1975 theoretically provided a regulatory
framework adaptable to the the joint state-local implementation of solar
energy. 182 The legislation did not expressly encourage the use of solar energy
and other alternative energy technology through land use planning techniques,
however, and substantial questions exist about the legality of local solar land
use policies. With the passage of the 1979 energy amendments to the Municipal
Land Use Law, 183 the legislature expressly delegated power to local planning
and zoning boards in New Jersey to implement land use policies to encourage
solar energy and energy conservation. The legislature authorized local planning boards to "promote the conservation of energy through the use of planning practices designed to reduce energy consumption and to provide for max184
imum utilization of renewable energy sources.''
The legislature also authorized other local planning and zoning tools, such
as energy conservation elements in master plans; •ss subdivision and site plan
review ordinances which maximize solar gain to buildings by proper street
orientation and requirements which serve to conserve non-renewable energy
186
and use renewable energy sources, and zoning ordinances which allow the
regulation of the bulk, height, orientation, and size of buildings and require
that buildings and structures use renewable energy sources, within limits of
practicability and feasibility in certain places. 187 Moreover, the governing bodies
of New Jersey municipalities were admonished by the 1979 amendments to
181

IJ

179. A rate structure that adversely impacts solar energy users may be difficult
to challenge under current case law. Several cases_arising under New Jersey public
utility law have upheld the legality of rate structures that subsidize all-electric customers,
despite antidiscrimination laws, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:3-1, -2, -4 (West 1969
& Supp. 1984-1985). For example, in Rossi v. Garton, 88 N.J. Super. 233, 211 A.2d
806 (App. Div. 1965), a New Jersey court held that an allowance of $150 to anyone
installing electric home heating did not violate the state's antidiscrimination statute.
The court interpreted the statute to bar only ''unjust'' discriminations and concluded
that only arbitrary discriminations are unjust. /d. at 236, 211 A.2d at 808.
180. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-9.
181. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:550-1 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (amended in
1979; additions to statute are underlined, deletions are crossed out).
182. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-3.
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
184. /d. § 40:55D-2(n).
185. /d. § 40:55D-28(b)(9).
186. /d. § 40:55D-38(b)(2); 40:55D-4l(e).
187. ld~ § 40:55D-65(b).
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periodically examine and prepare written reports with recommendations for
improvement on the extent to which there had been significant changes in
the assumptions, policies and objectives forming the basis for land use laws
with particular regard to energy conservation. 188
The 1979 energy amendments constituted a strong legislative policy statement authorizing and encouraging bold and innovative local solar energy planning approaches which could reduce New Jersey's unwholesome dependence
on petroleum fuels.' 89 Thus, prior to the supreme court's decision in Mount
Laurel//, New Jersey municipalities had a wide variety of land use planning
options to promote alternative energy within their borders. 190 These local solar
land use options included traditional zoning tools to expand solar access and
energy conservation such as low density zoning, new height, grade and setback rules, down zoning and overlays. A municipality could also write its own
solar comprehensive plans that would make vigorous use of legislativelymandated energy conservation elements by providing such components as
energy conservation provisions, required orientation of streets to take max ..
imum advantage of direct rays of the sun, prevention of structures and vegeta..
tion from blocking sunlight to approved solar collectors, and mapping out

188. /d. § 40:55D-89(c).
189. According to the Energy Master Plan, supra note 122, New Jersey's total
energy consumption by fuel type compares unfavorably to the Northeast region and
the United States in general, as shown by the following table:
New Jersey
Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear

TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL TYPE
1960
1970
71.80Jo
69.80Jo
18. 70Jo
12. SOJo
7. 70Jo
17.1 OJo
2.8o/o
.OOJo

1974
76.5o/o
16.70Jo
4.60Jo
2.3o/o

Northeast
Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear

54.80Jo
14.00Jo
28.90Jo
.OOJo

60.00Jo
16.40Jo
19.90Jo
0.90Jo

61.10Jo
15.40Jo
17 .40Jo
1.20Jo

United States
Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear

42.00'/o
31.40Jo
22.60Jo
.Oo/o

41.80'/o
34.3o/o
19.4o/o
.30Jo

43.70Jo
32.0o/o
17. 90Jo
I. 7o/o

190. See generally Blomquist, The Case for Local Solar Land Use Ordinances,
97 N.J. LAW. 39 (1981), reprinted in NEw JERSEY MuNICIPALITIES 40 (Nov. 1982) and
10 CuRR. MuN. PRoss. 49 (Summer 1983).
Local government officials could pick and choose from an assortment of solar
energy land use tools which are appropriate for the unique demography and developmental characteristics of the community. Moreover, different planning approaches could
be taken for varying neighborhoods within a single municipality. /d.
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areas of the municipality for special planned unit solar development polices.
A municipality could pass subdivision regulations and site plan review
ordinances which would provide for regulation of solar use and solar access.
Another option was to enforce solar envelopes and bulk plane zoning that
would provide a simple ''rectangular box envelope'' that could protect solar
access on nearby lots by outlining the three dimensional areas in which building
construction could take place on a particular lot. Zoning incentives for solar
use are especially useful in particular building projects or planned unit
developments where density bonuses could be awarded and transferrable solar
development rights given to developers for buildings laid out for solar access.
Under this latter technique, land ownership is severed into two categories permitting transfer of the affirmative right to solar access of a specific piece of
property to another site.
Yet another option was to enforce ordinances that declare vegetation or
structures that shade qualified solar collectors as constituting public nuisances.
A municipality might also have mandated local energy impact statements which
require analysis of the energy demand of a suggested development project and
the local and regional sources of energy available to meet the demand, requiring that solar energy and conservation be utilized whenever practical. Finally,
the municipality could provide a method for vesting solar collector rights
through local recording. After the Mount Laurel II decision, however, the
future of these practical and innovative solar energy planning techniques has
been considerably darkened.
•

E. New Jersey's Solar Energy Future: Possible Consequences of
Mount Laurel II
Mount Laurel II has threatened the future of solar energy development
in New Jersey. Yet, because there are a number of policy actors that may
react in different ways to the court's judicial mandates
including the New
Jersey Supreme Court itself
the actual turn of events in the coming years
is uncertain.
First, due in large part to increased fiscal pressures, it is considerably doubtful that New Jersey municipalities will undertake comprehensive solar planning and zoning after Mount Laurel//. The supreme court's decision adds yet
another local governmental responsibility to a host of existing demands for
scarce local tax dollars . Moreover, unlike other theoretically or truly discretionary municipal government services such as garbage collection, recreational
programs and solar planning efforts, the Mount Laurel II mandate is a matter
not of choice but of necessity. Indeed-, it is a matter of first order priority.,
Any effective local effort at solar planning will entail extra transaction costs
to the municipality to pay for land use experts, attorneys and engineers to
develop the plans and local officials to administer the plans once developed.
The municipality will also bear opportunity costs as local dollars spent on
solar development are dollars unavailable for other worthy purposes such as
schools, libraries, road improvements and sewage treatment plants. Moreover,
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land dedicated to solar energy construction is land unavailable for overzoned
"least cost" housing. Thus, Mount Laurel II creates a strong local disincentive against meaningful solar planning. Solar energy development was not a
top local priority before Mount Laurel II; after the decision it is likely to
be a luxury or worse, a dangerous oddity which might be viewed as an exclusionary zoning device by potential litigants.
Second, while sensible solar planning, building design, and site orientation do not necessarily add to new development costs, it is likely that continued uninformed opinion on the subject of solar construction and the
pressures created by Mount Laurel Irs least cost approach will lead local
officials to eschew required solar building standards in lower-income housing
construction. Life-cycle approaches to construction costs reveal that use of
19
solar energy results in significant net savings over traditional energy systems. '
Likewise, reasonably high housing densities can be achieved in many areas
without sacrificing solar access, provided the housing is carefully sited and
oriented. 192 Without special local efforts to understand and incorporate these
technical needs and the willingness to pay for expertise in addressing them
and educating developers, it is probable that local officials will avoid even
the appearance of adding to the cost of a building intended for low- and
moderate-income housing.
Third, even if a municipality were interested in undertaking the additional
costs and uncertainty of comprehensive solar planning after Mount Laurel
II, restrictive judicial interpretation of local powers under the Municipal Land
Use Law 193 has reduced that municipality's ability to use flexible and innovative
planning techniques to encourage solar heating use. For example, the New
Jersey Superior Court undermined the prospect for utilizing solar transferable
development rights recently in Centrex Homes of New Jersey, Inc. v. Mayor
94
& Council of Township of East Windsor.l There the trial court held that
New Jersey municipalities lack authority to adopt transferable development
right (TOR) programs under the Municipal Land Use Law. Thus, an act of
the legislature is apparently necessary to expressly delegate such authority,
as well as to spell out in detail precisely how TDRs are to be recorded, con195
veyed, taxed and treated generally. While it is arguable that this interpretation would be inappropriate in the case of solar transferable development rights
promulgated pursuant to the specific energy and solar planning powers
•

SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 27-29; N. SHAW & J. BAUER, A NEw
JERSEYAN's CoNsUMER GumE To SoLAR ENERGY SYsTEMs: WttH AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS

191.

113-14 (1978).
192. U.S.

DEP,T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEY., PROTECTING SOLAR ACCESS FOR
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PLANNING OFFICIALS 41 (1979).
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:550-1 to -99 (West Supp. 1984-1985).

194. No. L-06433-83 P.W. (Law Div. May 13, 1983), cited in Hluchan, Overview
of Pinelands Preservation Plan, 104 N.J. LAW. 21, 25 n.42 (1983).
195. Hluchan, Overview of Pinelands Preservation Plan, 104 N.J. LAW at 24.
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196

delegated by the legislature to municipalities, a municipality would face considerable legal uncertainty if it attempted to implement such a solar planning
technique in the face of the Centrex Homes decision. Finally, it would certainly
be rational for New Jersey's municipalities to totally abdicate responsibility
for energy policy in general, and solar ener.gy policy in particular, in the face
of the mandate for centralized statewide regional planning enunciated by the
197
Mount Laurel II court. There is, after all, no requirement that municipalities
actively encourage solar energy on the local level, only that they consider the
energy impact of their master plans. Indeed, the legislative history of the energy
amendments to the Municipal Land Use Law provides that municipalities,
"facilitat[e] the issuance of variances if they can be reasonably justified on
energy efficiency grounds, and promot[e] the exploitation of solar energy by
providing for the appropriate orientation of streets, within the limits of practicability andfeasibility.'' 198 The Assembly Energy and Natural Resources Committee viewed the amendments as flexible. The Committee noted that local
planning boards should incorporate energy conservation considerations into
their master plans (1) only upon the periodic revision of such plans, that is,
at least every six years, rather than immediately, and (2) only if such energy
conservation criteria are found to be practicable andfeasible. 199 If municipalities
perceive Mount Laurel II as .a policy sign-al that energy planning is now a
responsibility of the state, we can expect to witness a continuation of the trend
in centralized energy decision making with a bias toward traditional energy
sources at the state level.
. Furthermore, the Mount Laurel II decision contains no recognition of
the Energy Master Plan and allows little room for the solar and conservation
goals of the Pla.n to be implemented with respect to Mount Laurel-induced
new housing construction. The goals of the Energy Master Plan may have
been superseded by the supreme court's interpretation of the SDGP as con200
These perceptions will
trolling where two or more master plans conflict.
significantly retard attempts by the legislative and executive branches and
municipalities to pursue an energy efficient and solar future.
196. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
199. Assembly Energy and Natural Resources Comm. Statement, Assembly No.
1551--L. 1980, c. 146, quoted after text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 (West Supp.
1984~1985) (emphasis added).
200. The supreme court's complete analysis of the central importance of the SDGP
is contained Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 223-48, 456 A.2d at 427-35. While the court
did not expressly indicate in its opinion that the SDGP would control over another
state master plan, such as the ENERGY MASTER PLAN, this conclusion is justified by
reasonable inferences drawn from the opinion. First, the court has indicated that the
comprehensive plans for management and control of environmentally sensitive areas
prepared by the Division of Coastal Resources, Bureau of Coastal Planning & Development Department of Environmental Protection, and the Pinelands Commission would
govern the fair share obligation ''to the extent that these plans permit or encourage
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Socio-EcoNOMIC AND PoLITICAL SECOND-ORDER

CoNSEQUENCES OF

Mount Laurel II

One of the express purposes of Mount Laurel II is to foster social and
racial egalitarianism and to help alleviate the ~'self-destructive division between
201
affluent suburban are,as and depressed inner cities. "
Toward that end, the
New Jersey Supreme Court sought to zone poor people into substantial areas
of the state to reflect fundamental fairness and decency in the exercise of
202
governmental police power, since the state cannot favor the rich over the
203
poor in controlling the use of land.
Despite these goals, segregation along racial and economic grounds is likely
to continue. Rather than being on an exclusively regional basis, however, racial
and social segregation will resurface on an intra-municipal level within the
various municipalities subject to the Mount Laurel obligation. Although the
court expressly acknowledged that intra-municipal segregation will be accept204
205
able along economic lines,
and implicitly along racial lines,
it ignored
growth.'' /d. at 227 n.It, 456 A.2d at 424 n.ll. By negative implication, therefore,
the court would not recognize conflicting plans contained in another state master plan;
such as the Energy Master Plan. Second, the primacy of the SDGP, in the face
of other state master plans, is repeatedly mentioned in the course of the court's opinion.
See, e.g., 92 N.J. at 228 n.l2, 236, 246-47, 352, 456 A.2d at 425, 429, 435, 490. Third,
the court has interpreted the SDGP as having predominant authority over other state
agency ''functional plans." /d. at 234-35, 456 A.2d at 428-29. But see id. at 239, 456
A.2d at 431 (The court indicated that the SDGP will not be "the absolute determinant
of the locus of the Mount Laurel obligation'' since parties will be allowed the opportunity uto persuade the trial court, in a particular case, that the SDGP should not
determine whether the Mount Laurel doctrine applies to the particular municipality
involved in the case.").
201. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 416 n.5.
202. ld. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
203. /d.
204. Id. at 259-60, 456 A.2d at 442. The court stated:
[W]here fully developed municipalities are involved ... [t]he Mount Laurel
doctrine should ordinarily be able to be accommodated, for example, without
placing lowet income housing projects in the middle of long-settled middle
or upper income sections of a town.
• • • •

The proportion between [low- and moderate . . income housing within a
municipality will be] inevitably, a matter for expert testimony. It will depend
as does the fair share [obligation] itself, on a complex mix of factors.
/d. at 240 n.l5, 257, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5, 440.
205. Blacks and Hispanics make up a substantial portion of the nation's poor
people. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1-55 (1980). See
also K. AuLETTA, THE UNDERCLAss 255-61 (1983). As noted by Auletta:

Black Americans are three times as likely to be poor as whites, and Hispanics
more than twice as likely. In the introduction to the National Urban League's
Annual Assessment, The State of Black America 1980, Vernon Jordan, the
•
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the potential social costs of continued segregation. Without an assimilation
of middle- and upper-income residents and lower-income residents in a particular municipality and housing interaction between the races, the prospect
exists for discrimination in the provision of municipal services between dif~
ferent portions of a town, the creation of ethnic and class ghettoes and exacerbation of a ''rich versus poor'' mentality. Intra-school tensions between groups
of children who may perceive themselves as different from one another in
light of their obviously different housing patterns may not improve. 206
Mount Laurel II also inequitably redistributes wealth from residents of
growth areas, builders and upwardly-mobile homeowners to low-income
households. Implementation of the court's decision will force redistribution
of wealth from a few categories of individuals to lower-income households.
207
Mandatory "set asides" by builders amount to an internal subsidy
by
developers of the regional poor. According to one critic, if a developer erected
ten units, eight would rent or sell at a premium in order to subsidize the two
units which would be rented or sold to low- and moderate-income individuals.
To preclude a windfall profit, a set aside unit would not be freely transferable.
It could only be sold to a similarly situated individual at a limited increment
over the purchase price, such as the increase in the Consumer Price Index
for the period during which the unit was owned. The fairness of this procedure is questionable. Builders and purchasers of new homes should not be
responsible for subsidizing low-income housing. Society should pay for these
costs as a general, rather than a special, obligation. 208 Small builders, in particular, will be unfairly penalized since mandatory set asides are not suitable
for small projects. Moreover, disallowing an upwardly-mobile low- or moderateincome family from realizing the reasonable increase in market value of their
home when it is sold violates a basic aspect of owning property
realizing
a profit from appreciation of that property. Notwithstanding the initial subsidization, Mount Laurel II will inhibit a family from moving to a larger,
better home by realizing equity appreciation unless that new horne is also subsidized. Finally, property owners in municipalities containing growth areas
•

league's president, wrote "Black income, which was over 60 percent of white
income in 1969, fell to only 57 percent by the end of the decade. More blacks
were poor at the end of the seventies than at the beginning. The black middle
class, described as rapidly expanding by some so-called experts, actually
declined from 12 percent to 9 percent of all black families during this period.
. . . On balance . . . the seventies were not a time of progress within Black
America." According to the National Puerto Rican Forum, the family income
of Puerto Ricans dropped from 71 percent of the national average in 1959
to 47 percent in 1979.
/d. at 255.
206. See generally STATE BAR MouNT LAUREL II
207. Bernstein, supra note ll 0, at 4.
208. /d.

REPORT,

supra note 2.
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on the SDGP will be unfairly burdened by the Mount Laurel decision. They
will have to absorb the substantial costs of subsidizing lower-income housing
while homeowners in towns with little or no growth areas will not have to
bear any burdens of the supreme court's decision to transfer wealth to lowerincome individuals and are likely to enjoy a windfall profit of appreciated
property values. Beyond the aforementioned inequities and substantial disincentives for actual construction, Mount Laurel II may threaten fair and efficient
209
local control of housing prices and the availability of sufficient municipal
operating funds to maintain the subsidized units in good repair.
Mount Laurel II will result in inefficient planning decisions while discouraging new jobs and industry. To force compliance with its doctrine and actually
to induce the construction of lower-income housing, the court created some
economically inefficient legal principles. The court's suggestion that
210
municipalities help assure compliance through "overzoning"
for lower;..
income housing until such housing is actually built is the most blatant inefficiency. While overzoning may well achieve compliance, other important social
and economic goals will be sacrificed or undermined in the process. Overzoning, of course, implies displacement of other potential uses: schools, health
facilities, industrial sites, parks, and other public and private uses. It is true
that the bigger communities with relatively large tracts of undeveloped land,
such as Mount Laurel Township, will bear less of an opportunity cost than
geographically smaller communities, but both large and small communitieswill be denied the opportunity of making the most efficient use of their available
land while they wait for ultimate compliance decisions from the courts.
Mount Laurel II will also act as a disincentive for municipalities to undertake aggressive campaigns to attract industry and business. This pernicious
effect will, in turn, have a detrimental impact on employment opportunities
for New Jersey residents. Municipalities' governing bodies will be unsure about
what their obligations are under Mount Laurel// because an important criterion
for a municipality's fair share is its present and future employment
211
opportunities.
While the court probably defined fair share in this way to
preclude overzoning for industry, its effect is to reduce industrial and
office/research zoning, even where it is desirable. It would not be surprising
if communities in non-growth areas were reducing or deleting their nonresidential zoning in order to preserve their status under the SDGP and to
209. Municipalities have consistently had problems with administering analogous
rent control ordinances. This has led to inequitable rentals placed on housing units
by local rent control boards and, therefore; discouragement of housing opportunities
within a locale. See generally C. BAIRD, RENT CoNTROL: THE HousiNG CRISIS_U.S.A.
35-39 (1971); D. MANDELKER, HOUSING SUBSIDIES JN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
19-20 (1973).
210. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 262 n-.26, 456 A.2d at 453 n.26 (citing
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 5l9, 371 A.2d 1192,
1210-11 (1977)).
211. 1d. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440.
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keep out of the growth category, while municipalities in the growth areas were
restricting commercial and industrial zoning in order to limit their fair share
obligation. This result will not be beneficial because businesses will not move
from the suburbs to the cities, such as Newark, Trenton, or Camden, but
will continue to decide between the Piscataways and Parsippany Troy-Hills
212
of the state
attractive suburban communities on major highways.
Inefficiency in land use planning is institutionalized by Mount Laurel II.
Despite the court's indication that a compliance order will have res judicata
effect for six years, 213 the court created a wide and uncertain exception to
this rule in a seemingly innocuous footnote. Indeed, the court warned that "a
substantial transformation of the municipality may trigger a valid Mount Laurel
claim before the six years have expired. " 214 This warning leaves the bench
and bar wondering what "substantial transformation" means. This issue will
only be settled by further litigation which, itself, creates substantial additional
transactional and opportunity costs for municipal governments.
In addition to the new Mount Laurel II responsibility imposed on growth
area municipalities by the court, local governments must shoulder a considerable
number of existing legal obligations imposed by the legislature and certain
state administrative agencies. This is no more apparent than in the area of
education, where local school districts are forced to provide a number of programs centrally mandated by the State Department of Education without
adequate funding to carry out their responsibilities. 215 The court ignores the
marginal effect of continued centrally prescribed municipal obligations without
provision for adequate state funding to meet them.
There is a notable lack of analysis by the court of the potential interstate
effects of its decision. The court overlooked the palpable incentive that Mount
Laurel II will give to poor families and individuals residing in other states
216
to move into New Jersey's new lower-income housing,
and the concomitant, though regrettable, prospect of midde- and higher-income families fleeing the state. New Jersey is already recognized as an entry point for a substan217
tial number of poor immigrants.
212. See Bernstein, supra note 110, at 5.
213.· Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 2,91-92, 456 A.2d at 458-59.
214. /d. at 292 n.44, 456 A.2d 459 n.44.
215. For example, New Jersey boards are continually required to carry out programs for which no funds are provided. See NJSBA 1983 LEGISLATIVE GoALs at 8.
216. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 222 n.8, 456 A.2d 422 n.8. But see STATE
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 2-4, 6 (Department of Community Affairs'
planners viewed the impact of the 1975 Mount Laurel I decision as minimal and did
not incorporate lower-income housing projections into its future population projections).
217. New Jersey, while being ninth in overall population nationwide, was sixth
in the population of aliens reporting under the Alien Address Program in 1979, having
269,000 or 5.30Jo of resident aliens nationwide. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1980 99 (Dec. 1980). See generally Ruebens, Aliens, Jobs and
Immigration Policy, 51 Pus. INTER. 113 (1978) (discussing the detrimental impact on
our labor market of legal resident aliens as well as illegal aliens). The national shortage
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The supreme court notes that in non-growth areas such as limited growth,
conservation, and agricultural areas, no municipality will have to provide for
more than the present need generated within the .m unicipality, for to require
more would be to induce growth in that municipality in conflict with the
SDGP. 218 The proviso to this rule, however, is that if a municipality containing non-growth areas is found to have encouraged or allowed development,
219
the SDGP "non-growth characterization" may be inappropriate. The court
apparently expects the numerous patchwork municipalities containing growth
and agricultural or conservation areas to provide for an appropriate fair share
of the region's low-income housing need. 220
Application of the standard to some patchwork municipalities containing
growth areas that are already fully developed, 221 but which consist substantially of upper-income housing, will create a windfall fiscal benefit for the
local governments relying on that tax base. In these municipalities, the proximity of relatively expensive and exclusive housing to environmental amenities
such as open space, farmland, and preserved natural areas will have a tendency
to make the existing housing stock very valuable to prospective buyers in the
middle and upper income levels. Accordingly, property values, assessed valuations, and tax revenues will tend to rise because of the fortuitous operation
of Mount Laurel II. Examples of such communities in Burlington County would
include Evesham Township and Medford Township.
Conversely, application of this standard to other patchwork municipalities
containing growth areas that are substantially undeveloped will unfairly penalize
these municipalities for undertaking reasonable and necessary encouragement
of tax ratables such as industrial facilities and single family housing. While
the supreme court has partially anticipated this problem by positing some vague
222
a municipality in this situation would face conhypothetical examples,

in adequate housing for lower-income families is documented in DouGLAS REPORT,
''BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY," H.R. 91~34, 9lst Cong . , lst Sess. (1968): NATIONAL
CoMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HousiNG, JoBs AND HousiNG 48 (1970).
For
a
disc.
u
s•
sion of the regional inadequacies of such housing stock, see NEw JERSEY CouNTY AND
MUNICIPAL Gov'T STUDY CoMM'N, HousiNG & SuBURBs: FISCAL & SociAL IMPACT oF
MuLTIFAMILY DEv. (1974). See also Main, The Homeless of New York, 72 Pus. INTER.
3 (1983) (estimated 36,000 homeless poor on the streets of New York City). See generally
Palmieri, The Refugees: What Hfnfighting,'? 68 Pus. INTER. 88 (1982).
218. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 244, 456 A.2d at 433-34.
219. /d. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33.
220. /d. at 243, 456 A.2d at 433.
221. ld. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.15.
222. The court gave the following hypothetical:
If a municipality that is substantially rural changes only to the extent of an
added industrial use and fairly large residential subdivision, that might or
might not constitute a substantial change, depending on all of the circumstances; if in addition there was further development of its infrastructure
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siderable uncertainty in formulating future zoning and tax plans. This uncertainty is an inequitable fiscal burden since it involves extra municipal transactional costs such as the need to hire more professional assistance in attempting to interpret the law, as well as incurring opportunity costs by being inhibited
from vigorously seeking new industry and development needed to support the
existing population. The burden falls randomly on some municipalities and
not on others.
The court's acknowledged buckpassing of difficult problems stemming
from its decision in Mount Laurel II undermines its own judicial legitimacy.
Critics of judicial activism accuse some courts of assuming an elitist posture
that violates sovereignty and reaches deep into the lives of people against their
will. 223 These critics contend that judicial activism in a democratic society tends
to atrophy the sense of responsibility of both citizens and elected represen224
In addition, since the
tatives in making fundamental political decisions.
judicial branch has a limited supply of political "capital" to draw upon, each
time it tampers with policy supported by political majorities through interventionism, the judiciary jeopardizes its own institutional power base. 225
While the New Jersey Supreme Court enjoyed a relatively large balance
of political capital when it decided Mount Laurel I; it has substantially depleted
that capital over the ensuing years. In 1975, the Mount Laurel doctrine was
new and promising. In spite of public opinion favoring zoning for fiscal goals,
popular opposition to racial segregation and public support for equal housing
opportunities by New Jersey citizens gave the court considerable leeway in
judicial policymaking in this area. 226 The progeny of Mount Laurel I served
to confuse and obfuscate municipal fair share obligations under the state
227
constitution, however, and realistically limited the political acceptability of
the court's continued experimentation in exclusionary zoning cases.
Mount Laurel II is dangerous because it seeks to borrow political capital
.

.

.

.

and several new substantial places of work and residential subdivisions, that
municipality's SDGP classification should probably be changed.

ld. at 241-42, 456 A.2d at 432 (emphasis in original).
223. See, e.g., Glazer, Towards An Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTER. 104, 106-07
(1975), quoted in M. RESELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL PoLICYMAKING AND THE CouRTS
6 (1982).
224. /d.
225. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PRocEss (1980); A. Coxt THE RoLE OF THE SuPitEME CoURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT
.

.

2 (1976); R. McCLOSKEY, THE

226.

AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT

(1960).

supra note 3, at 67.
227. After Mount Laurel I the supreme court decided several cases dealing with
the Mount Laurel doctrine. See Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J.
127, 450 A.2d 381 (1979); Fobe Assocs. v. Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977);
Passack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Washington Township, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A . 2d 1192 (1977).
STATE SuPREME CoURTS,
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by passing off some of the most troublesome problems presented by the ruling onto other state officials and, ultimately, to the electorate. To illustrate,
the court presents a fiscal fait accompli to the legislature, not unlike Robinson v. Cahill/ 28 which has "all but rewritten the state tax code" 229 for the
second time in less than a decade. The court notes that inequitable tax and
other burdens caused by the location of lower-income housing are the result
of the state having made its decision on where development
should
occur
.
•
If location in accordance with that state plan has adverse economic consequences, the court found that it would be appropriate for the legislature rather
than the court to correct them. 230
This express avoidance of responsibility is especially dangerous because
the court's premise that the legislative and executive branches mandated
development according to the SDGP is questionable, and the court has confronted the legislature in a time of long-term state fiscal austerity. 231 The New
Jersey Supreme Court has also abdicated responsibility for implementing several
of the details of its decision. The court noted that ''the application of the
Mount Laurel doctrine to fully developed municipalities will undoubtedly pose
232
difficult problems,''
but that a satisfactory resolution of the occasionally
conflicting interests at times requires creativity and cooperation. 233
·
The Mount Laurel ruling creates false hope for certainty and simplicity
and will result in continued protracted litigation. The supreme court believes
that its decision in Mount Laurel II will clarify the Mount Laurel doctrine
and make it easier for public officials, including judges, to apply it, 234 while
235
simplifying litigation in this area. The court's view is unrealistic. The new
Mount Laurel doctrine will continue to be enormously complex to administer
and to interpret. Municipal officials attempting to understand the doctrine and
trying in good faith to apply it to their towns, as well as judges who will
be forced to grapple with its numerous principles, subtleties and exceptions,
will face great uncertainty in dealing with future exclusionary zoning cases.
Rather than employing one simple test for the determination of a
municipality's obligation to provide low- and moderate-income housing, Mount
Laurel II actually involves nine anticipatory standards. In turn, many of these
standards are pregnant with alternative sub-standards and unresolved sub-issues.

228. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
229. STATE SuPREME CouRTs, supra note 3, at 8.
230. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 239, 456 A.2d at 431.
231. Despite a short-term budget surplus in 1984, the State has been faced with
periodic reports of revenue shrinkage and concomitant proposals for spending cuts.
See, e.g., Task Force Recommends $500,000,000 Cut in School Aid, VII School Board
Notes (New Jersey School Boards Association), Oct. 13, 1983, at I, col. 2.
232. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5.
233. /d.
234. See id. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
235. /d. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
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Indigenous Poor Obligation Standard

All municipalities in the state, no matter what their planning designation
on the SDGP, "must provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for
its indigenous poor except where they represent a disproportionately large seg236
ment of the population as compared with the rest of the region." Questions
exist about what will constitute "decent housing" in the court's view, what
would constitute ''a disproportionately large segment of the population'' sufficient to absolve the obligation, and how these factors should be balanced.
•

B.

Total Growth District/Full Fair Share Standard

In those municipalities of the state entirely made up of growth area designations, which are not "fully developed" communities, 237 and where no special
proofs are proffered to show cause for deviation from the SDGP, Mount Laurel
II requires an unequivocal obligation to provide what can be termed a "full
fair share" of the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing. In
other words, these municipalities' fair share calculations would be based on
consideration of the total land area and total existing population of the
municipality.

C.

Partial Growth District Standard

By virtue of the SDGP's creation of several patchwork municipalities where
growth areas are combined with other non-growth classifications, such as
limited growth, conservation and agriculture, a "partial fair share'' obligation will exist in some locales. 238 In computing the Mount Laurel II quan236. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
237. /d. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5.
238. As noted by the court:
The existence of a municipal obligation to provide a realistic opportunity
for a fair share of the region's present and prospective low and moderate
income housing need will no longer be determined by whether or not a
municipality is "developing." The obligation extends, instead, to every
municipality, any portion of which is designated by the State, through the
SDGP, as a "growth area." This obligation, imposed as a remedial measure,
does not extend to those areas where the SDGP discourages growth
namely,
open spaces, rural areas, prime farmland, conservation areas, limited growth
areas, parts of the Pinelands and certain Coastal Zone areas., ... Moreover,
the fact that a municipality is fully developed does not eliminate this [the
Mount Laurel II] obligation although, obviously, it may affect the extent of
the obligation and the timing of its satisfaction. The remedial obligation of
municipalities that consist of both "growth areas" and other areas may be
reduced, based on many factors, as compared to a municipality completely
within a "growth area."

Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418. See generally id. at 354-74, 456 A.2d at 491-50 (the Appendix
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titative housing obligation in these communities, only land area and population that is within a growth area on the SDGP will likely be considered. In
these patchwork municipalities, the deviation from what would otherwise be
a ''full fair share'' obligation, that is, assuming the municipality was made
up entirely of growth areas on the SDGP, will vary depending upon the ratio
of growth area land to non-growth area land.

D.

Total Growth District/Fully Developed Community Standard

Municipalities subject to this standard will have their entire land area
designated as a growth area on the SDGP, but will be fully developed. The
court makes an exception from both the total growth district standard and
239
the partial growth district standard for fully developed municipalities. The
language establishing this exception is ambiguous since it is not clear what
,is quantitatively involved in exercising ''great care ... to assure that the benefit
of Mount Laurel II is not offset by damage to legitimate zoning and planning
objectives" 240 or resolving "occasionally conflicting interests [with] creativity
241
and cooperation. "
This test is further confused by the court's rejection of
242
the former Mount Laurel I developing/non-developing distinction for determining a municipality's regional fair share lower-income housing obligation
on the one hand, followed by substantially the same standard when considering the quantitative numbers and locations of lower-income housing within
a particular municipality.
·
E.

Partial Growth District/Fully Developed Community Standard

Municipalities subject to this standard will be fully developed patchwork
municipalities which are made up of varying combinations of growth areas
and non-growth areas. 243

F.

Rebutted SDGP Standard

While subject to a heavy burden of proof, any party to a future Mount
Laurel lawsuit can theoretically challenge the SDGP's classification for a defendant municipality by providing expert testimony on why the SDGP designa244
tion was inappropriate or has become inappropriate.
Considerable further
litigation will no doubt be required to determine what kind of expert testimony
would be relevant or persuasive.
contains the SDGP "concept maps," which show numerous municipalities that are
in the nature of "patchwork" areas containing both growth and non-growth areas).
239. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 240, 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431, 431 n.15.
240. ld. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5.
241. /d.
242.. /d. at 223-25, 456 A.2d at 422-23.
243. See supra note 238.
244. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 239-40, 456 A.2d at 431.
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Pinelands/Coastal Zone Standards

The supre,me court noted that trial judges in Mount Laurel cases involving municipalities regulated by either the Pinelands Commission or the Division of Coastal Resources of the state Department of Environmental Protection must consider in detail the classification system involved to determine
whether imposition of the Mount Laurel doctrine would be consistent with
the regional planning goals of the agencies, and whether the constitutional
245
obligation will under any circumstances override those goals. The pertinent
Mount Laurel obligation of a municipality located in the Pinelands or the
coastal zone will be subject to a case-by-case determination. The factors to
be considered by the trial courts, however, are not specified. The court also
appeared to mandate a more complex analysis in these environmentally sensitive cases by virtue of the more detailed and ambiguous regional types of
land specified in the coastal zone (high growth, moderate growth, low growth,
barrier island) and the Pinelands (protection and preservation areas). By vir246
tue of the supreme court's follow-up decision in In re Egg Harbor Associates,
environmentally sensitive areas of the state are also subject to an agency's
imposition of an independently determined Mount Laurel obligation, subject
to judicial override.
H.

Judicial Wildcard Standard

The court left open the possibility that its elaborate Mount Laurel II standards will be subject to outright change or further revision or refinement. 247
In this regard, the court specifically noted that flexibility is needed since the
court's work is partially legislative in character. 24 s The possible meaning of
this caveat is limited only by the imagination of counsel. Almost any socioeconomic argument would seem to be pertinent.
/., SDGP Wildcard Standard

In a footnote to its opinion, the court set forth a fallback position in
the event that the State takes action rendering the use of the SDGP inappropriate for Mount Laurel purposes. 249 This could entail a failure by the
Department of Community Affairs to update periodically the SDGP, legislative
245. /d. at 245-46, 456 Aw2d at 434-35.
246. 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115 (1983). In this case the court held that the Coastal
Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1983), authorized
the state Department of Environmental Protection to condition approval of a proposed
development within the coastal zone on construction of "fair share" of low- and
moderate-income housing units. But see Crema v. Department of Envtl. Protection,
94 N.J. 286, 463 A.2d 910 (1983).
247. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 243, 456 A.2d at 433.
248. !d.
249. !d. at 248 n.21, 456 A.2d at 435-36 n.21.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

622

[Vol. 15:573

action overruling the court's use of the SDGP for Mount Laurel purposes
or continued unenforceable regional development standards. In the event that
the SDGP becomes inappropriate, a modified developing municipality Mount
Laurel I test will be imposed. This test is confusing at best. 250

v.

SOME LESSONS: MINIMIZING SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES

OF INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING

Innovative policymaking by state and federal courts is no longer new or
shocking. Despite continued debate by those who would limit the power of
courts to hear certain types of controversial cases, 251 the two decade-long trend
252
of active judicial involvement in a wide assortment of public law
policy
matters; including education, mental health, prison systems, land use regulation, environmental protection and energy promotion, will probably continue
unabated. As society becomes more complex, continued public law /institutional litigation will be the norm rather than the exception.
Indeed, for several decades_, state supreme courts have had significant
effects \vithin the states and on the nation as a whole 253 in the areas of
elaborative policymaking (extension of precedent enunciated by the United
254
restrictive policymaking (limitations or evasion of
States Supteme Court),
policy developed by the United States Supreme Court), 255 institutio-nal
policymaking (judicial activity directed toward preserving the autonomy and
250. /d. The court held that:
[D]eveloped municipalities shall be subje·c t to the Mount Laurel obligation
- that includes the central cities and the built-up suburbs. The most significant question in such cases will ordinarily be whether there is any land available
for development, and, if not, what kind of remedy is appropriate to assure
that as land becomes available, a realistic opportunity exists for the construction of lower-income housing, assuming it is otherwise suitable for that purpose.
In addition to urban areas and the built-up suburbs, "developing"
municipalities will be subject to Mount Laurel. To the extent that prior decisions imply that the so-called "six criteria" must be satisfied to characterize
a municipality as "developing" ... we disavow that implication. Any combination of factors demonstrating that the municipality is in the process of
significant commercial, industrial or residential growth or is encouraging such
growth, or is in the path of inevitable future commercial, industrial or residential growth will suffice.
/d. (emphasis in original).
251. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JuDICIARY, Glazer, Should Judges
Administer Social Services?, 50 Pus. INTER. 64 (1978); Glazer, Towards An Imperial
Judiciary?, 41 Pus. INTER. 104 (1975).
252. This paradigm was largely developed by Professor Abram Chayes in his article
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
253. STATE SUPREME COURTS, supra note 3, at xi.
254. /d. at xviii.

255. /d.
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integrity of tl)e judicial process); 2 s6 and complementary policymaking (rulings
that aid state legislative goals). 257 In light of the noticeable trend of retrenchment of federal court involvement in matters of arguable concern to the states,
occasioned by the Supreme Court's "new federalism," and the active
encouragement by some members of the United States Supreme Court of state
supreme courts' expansion of their policymaking roles, opportunities for state
supreme court policymaking in general, and innovative policymaking in
particular, 258 will increase in the remaining years of this century. 259
The central issue, then, is not a question of judicial legitimacy, that is,
whether state supreme court innovative policymaking in public law/institutional litigation is in keeping with the judiciary's proper role in the American
political system, although poor innovative policymaking can contribute to
public dissatisfaction with judicial power. Rather, as exemplified by the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mount Laurel II, the critical issue is one
of judicial capacity: legitimacy aside, can the judiciary capably handle the
new responsibilities it has assumed?
When embarking on innovative policy decisions in the future, state supreme
courts should be more concerned about crafting effective and targeted rulings, rather than justifying their power to make the rulings. In particular,
since innovative policy decisions have far-ranging second-order consequences
that are not readily detected or understood, state supreme courts should concentrate on minimizing these unintended consequences. In short, state supreme
courts must strive to become first rate anticipatory and prophylactic governmental institutions. They cannot be contented with merely emulating equalling legislative oversight committees, for instance, or executive agency planning staffs. Because of the modern scope and importance of their decisions,
state supreme courts must become preeminent social planners.
Supreme courts should canvass diverse
policy
perspectives
prior
to
mak.
ing remedial innovative decisions. This could be achieved by liberalizing standing requirements at the remedy phase of trial, active court solicitation of amicus
briefs from representative interest groups, and appointment of absentee
260
advocates
for interests not before the court. Before handing down an
innovative policy decision, state supreme courts should formulate, with the
assistance of court appointed experts and staff experts, judicial impact
261
statements to avoid unintentional consequences of the decision in chief. The
burden should be on the winning party in institutional litigation to put for-

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

/d.
/d. at xvii.

See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
STATE SUPREME COURTS, supra note 3, at xii.
Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 870-927 (1978).
261. B. LEVIN, THE COURTS AS EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKERS AND THEIR IMPACT
ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS 92-93 (1977).
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ward every plausible alternative remedy that might be consistent with the state
supreme court's decision on the legal issues together with assessments of projected consequences and costs. The losing party,s adversary presentation could
then assume a more useful form, and the court could· more easily weigh alternatives and probable costs against probable benefits. 2 (; 2
The issue of remedy should be considered a mixed factual and legal question, not just a purely legal question. This has presented problems in the past
where the evidence closes before the court's decision on the rights of the parties, and usually does not reopen thereafter. Since the decision on the remedy
entails a forecast of b-e havior, it presents factual as well as legal questions,
though, to be sure, these are questions about the future rather than about
the past. That the remedy presents questions about the future is all the more
reason to regard the facts as problematic rather than settled. 263 Supreme courts
should engage in a two~step decisional process: one, a substantive law decision preceded with full briefing and oral argument by the parties; the second,
a remedial decision preceded by written and oral input by the parties as well
as by court appointed experts, staff, and those groups or institutions that
will likely be affected by the decision.
State supreme courts should also retain special confidential experts to assist
them in gauging second-order consequences on an ongoing basis. These experts
would be trained in policy science, future studies, operations research and
systems analysis. Their reports would be confidential, subject to discretionary
release by the court to certain individuals and institutions for feedback and
input.
State supreme courts should set a separate oversight calendar of their major
innovative policy decisions, with a committee of two or three justices assigned
to review, on a periodic basis, the remedial progress in particular cases as
well as the evolving second-order consequences in a particular area. On recommendation by the supreme court's oversight committee, the supreme court
en bane could, on its own motion, bring a previously decided case back for
review and adjustment, with a particular eye directed at clarifying and
eliminating unintended second-order consequences of the decision. Supreme
courts might even find it advisable to issue perio.dic policy progress reports
which could be circulated among interested individuals and be subjected to
regular feedback.
State inter-branch policy review committees consisting of state supreme
court justices, legislators, executive cabinet representatives, gubernatorial aides,
and supporting staff could be established within states. These committees would
meet on an annual or semi-annual basis and review second-order consequences
of judicial decisions, as well as second-order consequences of legislation and
administrative regulations and policy. From the perspective of state supreme

262. CoURTS AND SOCIAL
263. Id. at 288-89.

POLICY,

supra note 6,

at 288~
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courts, this type of cross-fertilization would assist the courts in understanding
the full range of impact of their decisions.
VI.

CoNCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount Laurel II decision is a classic
example of innovative policymaking by a state supreme court. The decision,
while admirable in its goals and social purposes, presents the prospect for
troublesome second-order consequences in a number of policy areas, including
discouraging local land use measures designed to encourage solar energy
planning and construction, especially in new homes.
Since innovative judicial policymaking by state supreme courts is likely
to continue in scope and frequency in the future, state supreme courts should
focus greater attention on anticipating and preventing unintended second-order
consequences _of their decisions. A number of options are available; however,
all options suggest reformulation of the remedial stage of institutional litigation to allow a wider variety of input by non-parties, expert assistance in gauging potential impacts, and periodic follow-up by state supreme courts of their
major policy decisions.

